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ABSTRACT 
  Do members of the House of Representatives have a constitutional 
right to resign their seats? This Article uses that question as a window 
onto broader issues about the relationship between legislators and 
citizens and the respective roles of liberalism and republicanism in the 
American constitutional order. The Constitution explicitly provides 
for the resignation of senators, presidents, and vice presidents, but, 
curiously, it does not say anything about resigning from the House of 
Representatives. Should we allow the expressio unius interpretive 
canon to govern and conclude that the inclusion of some resignation 
provisions implies the impermissibility of resignation when there is no 
such clause? Or should we consider this a meaningless variation? 
  This Article examines how members left (or were prevented from 
leaving) the House of Commons, the colonial American legislatures, 
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the early state legislatures, and the Continental Congress and 
concludes that the background assumption at the Founding was that 
legislative seats could not be resigned. Moreover, the available 
evidence from the Constitution’s drafting shows that the Founders 
understood there to be a difference between the House and Senate 
with regard to resignation. The Article presents several reasons, based 
on the different institutional designs and functions of the two houses, 
why this might have been the case, including different term lengths 
and methods of appointment and the early Senate’s role as a quasi-
ambassadorial body. From this historical evidence, the Article 
suggests that the House has the power to prevent its members from 
resigning. 
  However, the House of Representatives has never exercised this 
power. After surveying the debates over resignation in the early 
Congresses, the Article concludes by considering policy reasons for 
requiring members to get the House’s permission to quit their seats. 
Specifically, the Article offers two paradigm cases for returning to the 
original understanding: the first case deals with members who wish to 
resign while they stand accused of ethical transgressions; the second 
case deals with members who wish to leave because legislative service 
has ceased to be convenient for them. The Article argues that both 
cases point toward the need for a return to a previous, more 
republican, understanding of resignations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Does a member of the United States House of Representatives 
have a constitutional right to resign? The question is deceptively 
simple—we are, after all, accustomed to seeing members resign all the 
time.1 But despite explicitly providing for the resignations of 
senators,2 the president,3 and the vice president,4 the Constitution’s 
text nowhere provides for the resignation of a member of the House 
of Representatives.5 A straightforward application of the expressio 
 
 1. There are a number of recent examples. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Representative Quits, 
Pleading Guilty in Graft, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, at A1 (noting the resignation of Randy 
Cunningham); Monica Davey, Lawmaker Guilty of Manslaughter; Says He’ll Resign, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at A1 (noting the resignation of Bill Janklow); Michael Grunwald, DeLay 
Pulls No Punches in Final Speech to House, WASH. POST, June 9, 2006, at A3 (noting the 
resignation of Tom DeLay); National Briefing Washington: Congressman Resigns over Scandal, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2006, at A13 (noting the resignation of Bob Ney); Hans Nichols, Ballance 
Resigns from Seat, HILL (Wash., D.C.), June 9, 2004, at 3 (noting the resignation of Frank 
Ballance); Christi Parsons & Rick Pearson, Hastert Farewell Urges Civility, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16, 
2007, at C3 (noting the resignation of Dennis Hastert); Dave Wedge, Meehan Move Leaves 
‘Power Vacuum’ in State Delegation, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 14, 2007, at 6 (noting the 
resignation of Martin Meehan); Kate Zernike & Abby Goodnough, Lawmaker Quits over E-
mail Sent to Teenage Pages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at A1 (noting the resignation of Mark 
Foley). 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (providing for the appointment of a replacement senator 
when “Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise”). 
 3. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his 
Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same 
shall devolve on the Vice President . . . .”); id. amend. XXV, § 1 (“In case of the removal of the 
President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become 
President.”). 
 4. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“[T]he Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, 
Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what 
Officer shall then act as President . . . .”). 
 5. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 (“When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, 
the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.”). 
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unius canon of interpretation,6 then, would seem to leave us at odds 
with everyday practice. Surprisingly, this fact has received almost no 
attention at all, either in the scholarly literature7 or in congressional 
 
 6. “Expressio unius” is short for “expressio unius est exclusio alterius”—the canon that 
holds that the expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of others. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, 
A DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 88–91 (2007) (describing the canon’s 
background and application); 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION 304–33 (6th ed. 2000) (same). So, for example, when a parent tells a child who 
is ogling a table full of desserts that the child may have one cookie and one brownie, it is 
understood to imply that the child may not also have two pieces of pie and a cupcake. Or, to 
take the question this Article considers, the inclusion of provisions for the resignation of some 
government officials can be read to imply that officials for whom no such provision exists may 
not resign. 
 7. Professor Currie, in his magisterial Constitution in Congress series, devotes less than a 
footnote to the issue of whether members of the House can resign. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 135 n.41 (1997) 
(suggesting merely that there is “no plausible reason for treating the two chambers differently in 
this regard”). Other scholars who study constitutional congressional procedure have given the 
issue of resignation even less attention. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. 
FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND 
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 189–227 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing constitutional 
requirements for serving in Congress, but not for leaving it); ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 465–593 (2d ed. 2002) (same); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 935–57 (4th ed. 2005) 
(discussing ballot access but not resignation); Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth 
of the Citizen-Legislator, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 623, 650 n.81 (1996) (noting in passing that the 
opportunity costs of running for political office are reduced because a successful candidate “can 
always resign to take advantage of [other] opportunities if they become sufficiently attractive”); 
Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 
386–437 (2004) (making no mention at all of the issue of resignation). Indeed, Lexis and 
Westlaw searches turn up a number of mentions of members who have resigned (or threatened 
to do so) but nothing about the constitutional issues raised by resignation. 
  There is a substantial political science literature on why members leave Congress and 
what they do next, but this literature, too, is wholly inattentive to the constitutional issues 
surrounding resignation from the House. Instead, it generally treats resignation as raising the 
same issues as retirement (that is, the decision not to run for another term)—it treats both as if 
they involve only issues of when and why members choose to leave the House. See, e.g., JOHN 
R. HIBBING, CHOOSING TO LEAVE: VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT FROM THE U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES passim (1982) (discussing retirement without mentioning resignation’s 
constitutionality); JOHN R. HIBBING, CONGRESSIONAL CAREERS: CONTOURS OF LIFE IN THE 
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 23–24 (1991) (providing detailed statistical analyses of the 
career paths of members of the House without ever discussing the constitutionality of 
resignation); DAVID R. MAYHEW, AMERICA’S CONGRESS: ACTIONS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE, 
JAMES MADISON THROUGH NEWT GINGRICH 129–67 (2000) (discussing postcongressional 
political ambition without mentioning the constitutionality of resignation); Allan G. Bogue et 
al., Members of the House of Representatives and the Processes of Modernization, 1789–1960, in 
1 THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: PATTERNS OF RECRUITMENT, LEADERSHIP, AND 
INTERNAL STRUCTURE, 1789–1989, at 21, 40–42 (Joel H. Silbey ed., 1991) (combining 
resignation, acceptance of federal appointment, running for another office, and election to the 
Senate into a single category of “voluntary termination” for the purposes of analysis); Charles S. 
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procedure manuals.8 Expressio unius is by no means an ironclad rule, 
 
Bullock, III, House Careerists: Changing Patterns of Longevity and Attrition, 66 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 1295, 1297–99 (1972) (discussing why career representatives leave the House without 
mentioning resignation’s constitutionality); Daniel Diermeier, Michael Keane & Antonio 
Merlo, A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347–49 
(2005) (discussing congressional career spans without mentioning constitutional issues 
surrounding resignation); Morris P. Fiorina, David W. Rohde & Peter Wissel, Historical Change 
in House Turnover, in CONGRESS IN CHANGE: EVOLUTION AND REFORM 24 passim (Norman 
J. Ornstein ed., 1975) (discussing congressional career spans without mentioning resignation); 
Stephen E. Frantzich, Opting Out: Retirement from the House of Representatives, 1966–1974, 6 
AM. POL. Q. 251, 251–54 (1978) (discussing representatives’ decisions to retire but failing to 
differentiate retirement from resignation); Richard L. Hall & Robert P. van Houweling, Avarice 
and Ambition in Congress: Representatives’ Decisions to Run or Retire from the U.S. House, 89 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 121, 121–22 (1995) (developing a rational choice–based model of when 
members voluntarily leave the House without discussing the constitutionality of resignation); 
Rebekah Herrick & David L. Nixon, Is There Life After Congress? Patterns and Determinants of 
Post-Congressional Careers, 21 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 489, 489–90 (1996) (analyzing 
postcongressional careers without discussing the constitutionality of resigning to pursue such 
careers); D. Roderick Kiewiet & Langche Zeng, An Analysis of Congressional Career Decisions, 
1947–1986, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 928, 928–29 (1993) (discussing the factors influencing 
members’ decisions on whether to leave their seats without ever mentioning the 
constitutionality of resignation); David L. Leal, Home Is Where the Heart Is: Congressional 
Tenure, Retirement, and the Implications for Representation, 30 AM. POL. RES. 265, 271–72 
(2002) (discussing postcongressional lobbying careers without mentioning the constitutionality 
of resigning to pursue such careers); Harvey D. Palmer & Ronald J. Vogel, Political 
Opportunity for Federal Appointment: The Case of Departing Members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, 1961–1992, 57 J. POL. 677, 685–86 (1995) (discussing motives for congressional 
resignations without mentioning the constitutionality of those resignations); Douglas Price, 
Careers and Committees in the American Congress: The Problem of Structural Change, in 2 THE 
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: PATTERNS OF RECRUITMENT, LEADERSHIP, AND 
INTERNAL STRUCTURE, 1789–1989, supra, at 385, 395 tbls.1–4 (noting the number of House 
resignations in several Congresses, but providing no analysis of these numbers); H. Douglas 
Price, The Congressional Career: Then and Now, in CONGRESSIONAL BEHAVIOR 14, 16–19 
(Nelson W. Polsby ed., 1971) (noting only the frequency with which House members have left to 
run for other offices). 
 8. See WM. HOLMES BROWN & CHARLES W. JOHNSON, HOUSE PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO 
THE RULES, PRECEDENTS, AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE § 23-4, at 484–85 (2003) (noting 
the procedure for resigning without considering its constitutionality); CLARENCE CANNON, 
CANNON’S PROCEDURE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 489 (1963) (noting that a 
resignation, once tendered, cannot be withdrawn—this is the only section mentioning 
resignation in the manual); LUTHER STEARNS CUSHING, LEX PARLIAMENTARIA AMERICANA: 
ELEMENTS OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 50, 186, 196 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 9th ed. 1874) (asserting, without any 
analysis or supporting evidence, that representatives may refuse to serve and that resignation 
creates a vacancy in all American legislative bodies); FLOYD M. RIDDICK, CONGRESSIONAL 
PROCEDURE 13 n.41 (1941) (devoting less than a footnote to the issue of resignation from the 
House); CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE, 
RESEARCH, AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE (1989) (making no mention at all of resignation); 
Thomas Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary Practice, in CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, WITH THE AMENDMENTS THERETO: TO WHICH ARE ADDED 
JEFFERSON’S MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, THE STANDING RULES AND ORDERS 
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but this hitherto overlooked difference in wording between the 
House and Senate Vacancies Clauses should at least provide the 
starting point for further inquiry. This is all the more so because this 
issue also has implications extending far beyond the resignability of 
House seats, raising important questions about the interplay between 
liberal and republican values in the American constitutional order. 
Whatever the differences amongst republican theorists,9 I take 
them to share at least two common principles. First, in Machiavelli’s 
words, the “laws make [people] good.”10 That is, the laws—which 
should be taken to mean not merely formal statutes and decisions, but 
also the more informal norms that constitute the governance of a 
polity—both educate citizens to desire to act in virtuous ways and 
constrain them from acting badly.11 And second, political actors have 
an obligation to act in furtherance of the public good rather than 
simply to pursue their own private ends.12 The first principle suggests 
 
FOR CONDUCTING BUSINESS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE OF THE 
UNITED STATES, AND BARCLAY’S DIGEST 43 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1861) 
(same). 
 9. And there are, indeed, significant differences. For an attempt to catalogue the various 
republicanisms, see Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1564–
76 (1988). 
 10. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES, 112 (bk. I, ch. 3) (Bernard Crick ed., 
Leslie J. Walker trans., Penguin Books 1998) (1531). 
 11. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 136–37 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that, in 
republican theory, the task of the legislator is to eliminate the citizenry’s corrupt “second 
nature” to allow for the restoration of its intrinsically good primal nature); id. at 284–85 
(describing how the institutional arrangements of the Venetian city state “mechanized virtù”); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 39 (1985) 
(identifying “education and inculcation of virtue” as “traditional republican means” of 
governance). 
 12. See MACHIAVELLI, supra note 10, at 275 (bk. II, ch. 2) (“[I]t is not the well-being of 
individuals that makes cities great, but the well-being of the community; and it is beyond 
question that it is only in republics that the common good is looked to properly in that all that 
promotes it is carried out . . . .”); POCOCK, supra note 11, at 75–76 (noting that service of the 
public good, rather than private interests, is crucial to a republican polity’s survival); id. at 201 
(“The republic is the common good; the citizen, directing all his actions toward that good, may 
be said to dedicate his life to the republic . . . .”); id. at 249–50 (“[O]nore is a form of civic virtù; 
it is attained in serving the common good, and in pursuing it and its concomitant values above 
all others, we are proclaiming the supremacy of the common good.”); Frank I. Michelman, The 
Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18 
(1986) (describing republicanism as oriented around the subordination of private ends to public 
ones); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 
VA. L. REV. 543, 551 (1986) (“Republicanism, unlike liberalism, exalts the good of the whole 
over the good of its individual members. Where liberalism finds the primary purpose of 
government to be promotion of the diverse goods of its individual citizens, republicanism finds 
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the importance of leadership by example—that is, the obligation of 
those in power to educate others in civic virtue by demonstrating 
their own commitment to virtuous behavior. The second principle 
suggests a stark contrast with a liberal, interest-group theory of 
politics. The republican does not believe that the common good is 
promoted as an unintended byproduct of individuals’ pursuit of their 
private goods. Rather, the public good is independent and must be 
pursued independently by citizens and rulers alike.13 In short, 
republican theory suggests that those in power have an obligation 
both to behave virtuously, by putting the public good ahead of their 
own private ends, and to promote virtue in the citizenry by being seen 
to act virtuously. 
Drawing on republican theory, this Article suggests that there 
are good reasons for treating resignation from the House as a matter 
of congressional grace rather than one of constitutional right. Under 
the interpretation suggested here, a member’s resignation would not 
become effective until accepted by a vote of the House, and, in 
certain limited circumstances, the House would be justified in 
refusing that acceptance. 
Part I of this Article traces the history of procedures used for 
leaving the British House of Commons. Although these procedures 
have changed over the centuries, they have never included 
resignation as a legal right; moreover, at the time of the American 
Founding, it was not always the case that a member who wished to 
leave the House of Commons would be able to do so. Part II shows 
that this understanding carried over into preconstitutional American 
 
its primary purpose to be definition of community values and creation of the public and private 
virtue necessary for societal achievement of those values.”); Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1550 
(“[I]n their capacity as political actors, citizens and representatives are not supposed to ask only 
what is in their private interest, but also what will best serve the community in general—
understood as a response to the best general theory of social welfare.” (footnote omitted)). 
 13. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 
606–08 (rev. ed. 1998) (opposing the classical republican conception of a polity bound together 
by social structure and a unity of interests with the modern liberal conception of competing 
interest groups vying for public advantage); Michelman, supra note 12, at 21 (“Republicanism 
contests with a so-called pluralist vision, which regards the political system as, ideally, designed 
to serve the self-defined private interests of individuals or groups, fairly represented in political 
forums, where they compete under fair rules for fair shares of the outputs of public policy.”); 
Philip Pettit, Reworking Sandel’s Republicanism, 95 J. PHIL. 73, 95 (1998) (book review) 
(contrasting republicanism with interest-group pluralism); Suzanna Sherry, Republican 
Citizenship in a Democratic Society, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1229, 1229 (1988) (book review) 
(contrasting “the liberal focus on communities as aggregations of individuals” with “the 
republican focus on individuals as members of communities”). 
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practice. Neither the colonial legislatures, nor the pre-1789 state 
legislatures (with a single exception), nor the Continental Congress 
under the Articles of Confederation recognized an individual’s right 
to resign. Part III shows that the available evidence from the drafting, 
ratification, and early commentary on the Constitution strongly 
suggests that the founding generation, too, had this understanding in 
mind. Specifically, this Part shows that the difference in wording 
between the House and Senate Vacancies Clauses was intentional, 
and it demonstrates that there are good structural reasons for treating 
the two chambers differently. Part IV traces the deviation from this 
interpretation, beginning in the Second Congress and continuing to 
the present day. Part V, however, offers two paradigm cases for 
returning to the original meaning. These cases—one of which deals 
with members who wish to leave the House while they stand accused 
of ethical transgressions and the other of which deals with members 
who wish to leave because legislative service is simply no longer 
convenient for them—both suggest that a turn toward a more 
republican conception of legislative service would be valuable. 
I.  LEAVING THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 
A. Before the Chiltern Hundreds 
In 1624, there were three candidates for the two parliamentary 
seats for the County of Gloucester: Robert Poyntz, John Dutton, and 
Sir Thomas Estcourt.14 Estcourt “declared openly” that he was voting 
for his rivals, “as not desiring the place for himself, but praying to be 
spared.”15 He was, however, returned for one of the seats, and the 
election was challenged in the House of Commons’ Committee of 
Privileges and Elections.16 The first question addressed by the 
committee17 was “[w]hether Sir Thomas Estcourt was eligible, against 
his own consent, and contrary to his desire.”18 The committee 
concluded that he was eligible because 
 
 14. JOHN GLANVILLE, REPORTS OF CERTAIN CASES DETERMINED AND ADJUDGED BY 
THE COMMONS IN PARLIAMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST AND TWENTY-SECOND YEARS OF THE 
REIGN OF KING JAMES THE FIRST 99 (London, Baker & Leigh 1775). 
 15. Id. at 100. 
 16. Id. at 99. 
 17. The committee also inquired into reports of polling irregularities in Gloucester, see id. 
at 101–03, but that inquiry is not relevant for this Article. 
 18. Id. at 101. 
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no man, being lawfully chosen, can refuse the place; for the country 
and commonwealth have such an interest in every man, that when, 
by lawful election, he is appointed to this public service, he cannot, 
by any unwillingness, or refusal, of his own, make himself incapable; 
for that were to prefer the will, or contentment, of a private man, 
before the desire and satisfaction of the whole country, and a ready 
way to put by the sufficientest men, who are commonly those, who 
least endeavour to obtain the place.19 
The House accepted its committee’s conclusion,20 and Estcourt took 
his seat. 
This strident assertion of republican obligation, in the face of 
countervailing personal inclination, was hardly new in 1624. Indeed, 
the idea that members of Parliament were obligated to serve dated 
back to the institution’s inception. Parliament’s origins lie in the 
medieval curia regis, the king’s council;21 as a body meant to assist the 
Crown, the king naturally had an interest in its composition.22 As 
Professor Kemp has noted, “[p]ermission to be excused from serving 
the king in parliament was a privilege which the king was seldom 
willing to grant.”23 She identifies only illness, royal service overseas, 
and captivity as grounds for resignation.24 When the king sought 
advice from a subject, the subject was bound to deliver it.25 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 103. 
 21. See JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND 
PHILOSOPHY 22 (1999) (“The first parliaments were meetings of the King and his tenants-in-
chief, in which he sought their counsel, consent, and material support in discharging his 
principal responsibilities, the defence of the realm and the dispensation of justice within it. The 
acts of those parliaments were acts of the King, and their authority was his authority, fortified 
by counsel and consent.”); CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT 
AND ITS SUPREMACY: AN HISTORICAL ESSAY ON THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN LEGISLATION 
AND ADJUDICATION IN ENGLAND 14–38 (1910) (tracing the development of Parliament). 
 22. See JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND 
DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 145–47 (2007) (noting 
that royal officials settled parliamentary election controversies until the late-sixteenth century). 
 23. Betty Kemp, The Stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds, in ESSAYS PRESENTED TO SIR 
LEWIS NAMIER 204, 205 (Richard Pares & A.J.P. Taylor eds., 1956). 
 24. Id. at 205 n.1. 
 25. See 1 EDWARD PORRITT, THE UNREFORMED HOUSE OF COMMONS: PARLIAMENTARY 
REPRESENTATION BEFORE 1832, at 239 (2d ed. 1909) (noting the Crown’s punishment of 
members who withdrew from Parliament without leave in 1554); see also A.F. POLLARD, 
FACTORS IN MODERN HISTORY 107 (1907) (noting that, under the Tudors, “[p]arliamentary 
representation was an irksome duty; men could no more resign a seat in Parliament than they 
can to-day resign their obligation to serve on juries or pay rates and taxes”). 
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During Elizabeth’s reign, the House of Commons began 
successfully to assert exclusive jurisdiction to determine questions 
about its own composition,26 including jurisdiction to determine 
whether a member would be permitted to resign.27 The House, 
however, proved no more willing to excuse its members from service 
than the Crown had—it allowed resignations only for sickness or 
other public service,28 and sometimes not even for those. In 
November 1605, two members sought leave to resign. John Hassard, a 
member for Lyme Regis, insisted that he was unable to serve “by 
Reason of the Gout.”29 The Committee of Privileges reported that 
Hassard came before them and that he “walked in Fear only.”30 The 
committee nevertheless recommended “[t]hat he should serve still,”31 
and the House agreed.32 (The precise reasons for refusing to allow 
Hassard to leave the House at this point are unclear, but the 
committee may have concluded that he simply was not sick enough to 
get out of his obligations.) Indeed, he remained in the House until 
1609, when his constituents petitioned the House to allow him to 
resign.33 The committee found that he was “incurable—bed-rid,” and 
he was finally allowed to leave the House.34 However, on the same 
day in 1605 that Hassard first sought to resign his seat, William 
Swaddon, the member for Calne, asked to be excused on the grounds 
that he was “[w]eak, and not able to serve, by Reason of Age, and not 
 
 26. See CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 145–47 (discussing the House of Commons’ vigorous 
and successful assertion of its right to judge disputes over the elections and qualifications of its 
members during the controversies surrounding the 1580 elections and the 1586 Norfolk 
election). 
 27. See Kemp, supra note 23, at 205 (“During Elizabeth’s long parliament (1572–83) the 
House successfully claimed that it alone could authorize both the resignation of members and 
the issue of writs for by-elections to replace them.”). 
 28. Id. at 206. 
 29. 1 H.C. JOUR. 257 (Nov. 9, 1605). 
 30. Id. I take this to mean that only the fear of the House’s displeasure induced him to 
leave his sickbed. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. 3 T.H.B. OLDFIELD, THE REPRESENTATIVE HISTORY OF GREAT BRITAIN AND 
IRELAND: BEING A HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AND OF THE COUNTIES, CITIES, 
AND BOROUGHS, OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD 372 (London, 
Baldwin, Cradock & Joy 1816). 
 34. Id. 
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likely to recover.”35 The committee recommended that he be excused, 
and the House allowed him to resign.36 
In addition to illness, the holding of other offices sometimes 
justified departure from the House. In 1606, at the beginning of a 
parliamentary session, the Lord Chancellor sent the Speaker of the 
House of Commons a list of seven members who had been appointed 
to royal offices since the previous parliamentary session.37 On the 
advice of the Committee of Privileges, three of the members were 
excused from service and four were made to keep their parliamentary 
seats.38 (The excused members were those who had been appointed to 
royal offices with life patents; the unexcused members were not 
appointed “for Life.”39) Indeed, even the holding of an office legally 
incompatible with parliamentary service did not guarantee permission 
to resign. In 1629, John Lynn sought permission to leave the House, 
having been elected mayor of Exeter.40 The House concluded, 
however, that, “being a Member of the House before he was elected 
Mayor, he ought to serve here,” and give up the mayoralty.41 
This was the milieu in which Thomas Estcourt was required to 
serve against his own wishes. Parliamentary service, which began as a 
royal duty, had become a republican one. This republican spirit 
continued for the rest of the seventeenth century. In 1641, George 
Abbott, who had been returned for the borough of Guildford in 
Surrey,42 requested that he be allowed to “decline his Election; and 
that a new Burgess be chosen to serve in his Stead.”43 The Journal of 
the House of Commons notes tersely, “The Motion was not thought 
fit to be granted.”44 After the Restoration, the standards for 
resignation seem to have loosened—in 1677, a member-elect was 
 
 35. 1 H.C. JOUR. 257 (Nov. 9, 1605). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 315–16 (Nov. 19, 1606). 
 38. Id. at 323–24 (Nov. 22, 1606). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 920 (Jan. 20, 1629). The House of Commons forbade simultaneous service as a 
mayor and as a member of Parliament. See id. at 246 (June 25, 1604) (resolving that “no Mayor 
of any City, Borough, or Town corporate, should be elected, returned, or allowed to serve as a 
Member of this House”). 
 41. Id. at 920 (Jan. 20, 1629). 
 42. Abbott’s first name and constituency can be found in 1 U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT: PARLIAMENTS OF ENGLAND, 1213–1702, at 494 (London, Hansard 
1878). 
 43. 2 H.C. JOUR. 201 (July 6, 1641). 
 44. Id. 
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allowed to “disclaim and renounce his Election” without any reason 
specified in the Journal.45 Importantly, however, this resignation was 
not of right: the Journal makes a point of noting that “the House 
allowed thereof.”46 (It should also be noted that members-elect could 
refuse to take the necessary oaths and thereby disqualify themselves.47 
This method of refusing a seat was unavailable, however, to a 
member who wished to resign a seat he already occupied or a 
member-elect who was uncomfortable refusing to swear the Oaths of 
Supremacy and Allegiance.) 
In the early eighteenth century, however, a series of statutes that 
were intended to limit the Crown’s power over Parliament had the 
unintended consequence of creating new possibilities for leaving the 
House. 
B. Statutory Incompatibility Provisions 
In 1701, as it became clear that neither the widowed King 
William III nor his successor, Princess Anne, would have any heirs, 
Parliament passed the Act of Settlement to ensure that a clear line of 
succession would prevent the Crown from falling back into the hands 
of the Catholic Stuarts.48 In addition to providing for the Crown to 
pass to the House of Hanover, the Act created several limitations on 
royal power to take effect when both William and Anne were dead.49 
One such limitation was the provision that “no Person who has an 
Office or Place of Profit under the King or receives a Pention from 
the Crown shall be capable of serving as a Member of the House of 
 
 45. 9 H.C. JOUR. 402 (Mar. 19, 1677). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See 2 JOHN HATSELL, PRECEDENTS OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 79 
(photo. reprint 1971) (London, Hansard, 4th ed. 1818) (reporting the occurrence of this practice 
in the 1689 Monson and 1698 Archdale cases). 
 48. Act of Settlement, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2. (1701). 
 49. Id. § 3 (noting that these provisions were necessary to secure “our Religion Laws and 
Liberties from and after the Death of His Majesty and the Princess Ann of Denmark”). The Act 
of Settlement can be understood as a second bill of rights. In the first Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. 
& M., c. 2, Parliament conditioned granting the Crown to the House of Orange on significant 
limitations on royal power. The very idea that the Crown was the Parliament’s to grant is seen 
as definitively establishing parliamentary supremacy in the English Constitution. See 
GOLDWORTHY, supra note 21, at 159–60; COLIN R. MUNRO, STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 128 (2d ed. 1999). Just as the 1689 Parliament gave the House of Orange a choice between 
a Crown reduced in power and no crown at all, so the 1701 Parliament gave a similar choice to 
the House of Hanover. This explains why the limitations were not to take effect until both 
William and Anne were dead—had the Act attempted to limit royal power immediately, it 
might well have been denied royal assent. 
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Commons.”50 The goal was to prevent undue royal influence over 
Parliament, but the means employed were too crude—the provision 
would have prevented even secretaries of state from serving in the 
House of Commons, a radical alteration of the traditional theory of 
English government, which had no strict principle of separation of 
powers and in which ministers of the Crown were frequently drawn 
from the House.51 
Before that provision of the Act of Settlement could come into 
effect, it was repealed by the 1705 Regency Act.52 In its place, the Act 
excluded from the House of Commons anyone holding one of an 
enumerated list of Crown offices, anyone holding a Crown office 
created after 1705, or anyone holding a pension at the pleasure of the 
Crown.53 Moreover, any member of the House of Commons who 
accepted “any Office of Profit from the Crown during such Time as 
he shall continue a Member” voided his election; however, so long as 
the office was not one of those enumerated, he could stand for 
reelection to the House of Commons.54 If reelected, he could hold 
both positions.55 (Members who served in the army or navy and 
received a promotion did not, however, void their elections.56) These 
provisions were to come into effect at the end of the Parliament that 
passed them57—under the Triennial Act, that could be no later than 
1708.58 In 1707, these provisions were repassed, essentially verbatim.59 
 
 50. Act of Settlement, c. 2, § 3. 
 51. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD’S ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY, FROM THE TEUTONIC CONQUEST TO THE PRESENT TIME 467 (11th ed. 1960) (“[Z]eal 
had outrun discretion in the Act of Settlement, which seemingly would have excluded even such 
place-holders as Secretaries of State or the Chancellor of the Exchequer. That rule would have 
given us a strict separation of executive and legislative organs such as still exists in the United 
States.”). 
 52. Regency Act, 1705, 4 & 5 Ann., c. 20, § 28. 
 53. Id. § 29. 
 54. Id. § 30. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. § 32. 
 57. Id. §§ 29–30. 
 58. See Triennial Act, 1694, 6 & 7 W. & M., c. 2, § 3 (providing that no Parliament could 
last longer than three years). 
 59. See 6 Ann., c. 41, §§ 24–27 (1707). The 1705 Regency Act, like the 1701 Act of 
Settlement, was primarily concerned with the succession to the English Crown. In 1707, the Act 
of Union with Scotland, 1707, 6 Ann., c. 11, created the United Kingdom of Great Britain. The 
1707 Regency Act was passed to address the same issues with respect to the British Crown. As 
the union raised no new issues with regard to incompatibility, those provisions were simply 
repeated with only minor and inconsequential alterations in wording. 
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Apparently impatient for the incompatibility rules to come into 
effect, the House of Commons resolved to enforce them in the 
present Parliament,60 and a number of members were shortly 
thereafter declared incompatible.61 
By 1715, at the latest,62 members had figured out that they could 
use the incompatibility provisions as a means of giving up their seats. 
This is well illustrated by a series of events between 1715 and 1717. 
On November 21, 1715, Richard Onslow accepted the royal office of 
teller of the exchequer, thereby vacating his seat in the House of 
Commons, where he represented the County of Surrey.63 His 
appointment as teller of the exchequer was a compensation for being 
forced out of the chancellorship of the exchequer, a position that he 
held for about a year.64 Teller of the exchequer was a substantial 
sinecure,65 and there is no indication that he accepted the position 
solely for the purpose of leaving his seat.66 He had also been promised 
a peerage, although he waited until the next year to take out his 
patent.67 However, on the same day that Richard Onslow accepted the 
tellership, his son,68 Thomas Onslow, also vacated his seat in the 
House, where he represented Bletchingly , by becoming “Out Ranger 
of his Majesty’s Forest of Windsor.”69 (Rangers were royal officials 
whose job it was to patrol the edges, or “purlieus,” of forests and 
 
 60. 15 H.C. JOUR. 396 (Nov. 10, 1707). 
 61. See, e.g., id. at 420 (Nov. 12, 1707) (ordering the issuance of new writs of election for six 
members declared incompatible by operation of the new rules). 
 62. See Kemp, supra note 23, at 207 (“It is not possible . . . to say definitely how many of 
the eighty or so members who lost seats [during the first half of the eighteenth century] as a 
result of appointment to office used their offices for the purpose of quitting their seats.”). 
 63. 18 H.C. JOUR. 328 (Nov. 21, 1715). 
 64. 2 ROMNEY SEDGWICK, THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1715–1754, at 310 (1970). 
 65. See 5 EVELINE CRUICKSHANKS, STUART HANDLEY & D.W. HAYTON, THE HOUSE OF 
COMMONS, 1690–1715, at 36 (2002) (describing the tellership as “lucrative”). 
 66. See id. (noting that “his evident dismay at losing the [chancellorship] was to some 
degree alleviated” by the tellership). 
 67. Onslow apparently waited to take out his patent to avoid the appearance of 
impropriety: 
[H]aving been a member of the House of Commons committee whose report had led 
to the impeachment of the heads of the late Tory Government, he was reluctant to 
take out his patent until the impeachments were out of the way, so that ‘they who had 
been accusers might not sit as judges in the same cause.’ After some months, owing to 
the delay in trying Lord Oxford, he compromised by taking out his patent and 
abstaining from voting on anything relating to the impeachments. 
2 SEDGWICK, supra note 64, at 310–11. 
 68. Id. at 311. 
 69. 18 H.C. JOUR. 328 (Nov. 21, 1715). 
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drive back into the forest any deer that might seek to explore life in 
the larger world.70 The out ranger was likely a ranger who did not live 
in—and therefore, did not actually patrol—the forest for which he 
was responsible.71 The job was thus an office without responsibilities.) 
Although this office came with a large sinecure,72 Thomas also viewed 
it as a means of vacating his seat, as he immediately stood for and was 
elected to his father’s old seat in Surrey.73 In 1717, his father, who by 
then had accepted his peerage, died.74 Thomas Onslow was now Lord 
Onslow, thus making him a member of the House of Lords and 
requiring that a new writ be issued for a representative of Surrey in 
the House of Commons.75 Five days later, Richard’s uncle, Denzil 
Onslow,76 who represented Guildford in the House of Commons, 
vacated his seat by accepting the post of out ranger of Windsor 
Forest.77 Denzil then stood for and was elected to the Surrey seat.78 
Surrey was clearly a more desirable seat for members of the 
Onslow family—it was a county seat, whereas Bletchingly and 
Guildford were both borough seats,79 and county seats had long been 
more prestigious.80 The family thus used its royal connections81 to get 
 
 70. See JOHN MANWOOD, MANWOOD’S TREATISE OF THE FOREST LAWS 313–15 (William 
Nelson ed., London, Nutt, 4th ed. 1717). This job may sound silly, but it must be remembered 
that, although the Crown did not own all of the land in the forest, it did own all of the beasts of 
the forest. See 6 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 2, para. 1149 (Viscount Hailsham ed., 2d 
ed. 1932). The ranger thus served to ensure that the king’s venison did not wander away. 
 71. See 10 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1001 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “out-” as 
“[i]n the sense, ‘Living, residing, or engaged outside (a house, hospital, borough, city, country, 
etc.)’, usually as distinguished from those of the same body or class living, residing, etc., within” 
and giving “out-ranger” as an example). The fact that Thomas Onslow was simultaneously a 
member of Parliament for Surrey, see infra text accompanying note 73, and the out ranger of 
Windsor Forest strengthens this interpretation. It seems unlikely that he was sitting in the 
House of Commons by day and chasing deer by night. 
 72. 5 CRUICKSHANKS ET AL., supra note 65, at 39. 
 73. Id.; 2 SEDGWICK, supra note 64, at 311. 
 74. 2 SEDGWICK, supra note 64, at 310–11. 
 75. 18 H.C. JOUR. 658 (Dec. 13, 1717). 
 76. Denzil Onslow (c. 1642–1721) was a younger son of Sir Richard Onslow (1601–64). 
Denzil’s older brother Arthur was Sir (later Lord) Richard Onslow’s (1654–1717) father. See 5 
CRUICKSHANKS ET AL., supra note 65, at 18–40; 2 SEDGWICK, supra note 64, at 309–12. 
 77. 18 H.C. JOUR. 660 (Dec. 18, 1717). 
 78. 2 SEDGWICK, supra note 64, at 309–10. 
 79. See 5 CRUICKSHANKS ET AL., supra note 65, at 18–40. 
 80. See, e.g., J.E. NEALE, THE ELIZABETHAN HOUSE OF COMMONS 313 (1949) (noting that 
in each of the ten instances of fathers and sons sitting together in the 1571 parliament, “the 
fathers sat for their county and the sons for boroughs, mostly within the county”); LAWRENCE 
STONE & JEANNE C. FAWTIER STONE, AN OPEN ELITE? ENGLAND 1540–1880, at 241 (1984) 
(“Borough MPs could often buy their seats or intimidate the electorate. The position of Knight 
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Thomas and Denzil appointed to an insignificant office that, by virtue 
of the incompatibility clauses, vacated their seats, thus allowing them 
to stand for the Surrey seat when it became available. Other members 
seem to have learned from the Onslows, and a number of others 
vacated seats in similar manners between 1715 and 1750.82 
C. The Chiltern Hundreds 
Beginning in the 1750s, royal stewardships—principally, the 
stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds—came into use as the primary 
means of vacating House seats. The three Chiltern Hundreds of 
Stoke, Desborough, and Burnham, in Buckinghamshire,83 were royal 
properties at least as early as the reign of Edward I.84 The Hundreds 
were administered by a steward, an office of profit under the Crown, 
appointed in the exchequer.85 By the eighteenth century, the office 
had ceased to carry any administrative functions, nor was it any 
longer a source of measurable profit.86 It was still formally an office of 
profit under the Crown,87 however, and therefore holding it triggered 
the statutory incompatibility rule.88 
In 1751, the stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds was first used 
as a means of leaving the House. On the same day that two seats in 
 
of the Shire [that is, the holder of a county seat], on the other hand, was at the choice of the 
leading squires and nobility of the county . . . .”); E.A. Wasson, The Penetration of New Wealth 
into the English Governing Class from the Middle Ages to the First World War, 51 ECON. HIST. 
REV. (n.s.) 25, 30 (1998) (noting that members of the English landed elite served as “shire 
knights if possible and borough members if necessary”). 
 81. See 5 CRUICKSHANKS ET AL., supra note 65, at 36 (noting Richard Onslow’s “strong 
position at court”); id. at 39 (noting the “favour of the new King [George I]” bestowed upon 
Thomas Onslow and his subsequent favor with George II). 
 82. See Kemp, supra note 23, at 208 (noting the likely use of several other Crown offices 
for the purpose of leaving House of Commons seats in the first half of the eighteenth century). 
 83. For a map of the Chiltern Hundreds, see U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS INFO. OFFICE, 
THE CHILTERN HUNDREDS app. A (2008), available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/ 
upload/p11.pdf. 
 84. 3 ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 100 (E.A. Jelf ed., 3d ed. 1938). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.; U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS INFO. OFFICE, supra note 83, at 3. 
 87. See 2 HATSELL, supra note 47, at 55 n.§ (recognizing that the stewardship is formally an 
office of profit, but suggesting that only longevity of use prevents one from questioning whether 
any profit in fact accrues to the steward). 
 88. The logistics of holding the stewardship are simple: a member applies to the chancellor 
of the exchequer for the office. If it is granted, the member’s seat in the House is immediately 
vacated. The member continues to hold the stewardship until the next appointment to the 
stewardship, which revokes the patent of the previous officeholder. See U.K. HOUSE OF 
COMMONS INFO. OFFICE, supra note 83, at 2. 
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Dorchester were declared vacant,89 John Pitt vacated his seat in 
Wareham by accepting the Stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds.90 
He promptly stood for and was elected to one of the vacant 
Dorchester seats. The next year, we find the first instance of a 
member using a stewardship to retire altogether. Henry Lascelles, 
who represented Northallerton, vacated that seat by accepting “the 
Office of Chief Steward and Keeper of the Courts of the Honour of 
Berkhamstead, and of the Manor, Lordship, and Town of 
Berkhamstead,”91 a post similar to the stewardship of the Chiltern 
Hundreds. His son, Daniel, stood for and was elected to his old seat, 
and Henry Lascelles died the next year.92 In 1753, Henry Vane, who 
represented Durham, was elevated to the peerage, thus vacating his 
seat.93 The same day, his son (also named Henry) accepted the 
stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds, thus vacating the seat for 
Downton.94 The younger Vane immediately stood for and won his 
father’s old seat.95 And in 1757, William Pitt the Elder accepted the 
stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds (much as his cousin John had 
done six years earlier), thus vacating the seat for Okehampton,96 
which he had held for only about seven months.97 Pitt had just become 
prime minister, and he took the opportunity to switch constituencies 
to Bath, his second home and a seat that he would not have to work 
very hard to retain.98 
 
 89. See 26 H.C. JOUR. 5 (Jan. 18, 1751) (noting vacancies created by Nathaniel Gundry’s 
acceptance of a justiceship on the Court of Common Pleas and by John Browne’s death). 
 90. Id. 
 91. 26 H.C. JOUR. 497 (Mar. 17, 1752). 
 92. 2 SEDGWICK, supra note 64, at 199–200. 
 93. 26 H.C. JOUR. 805 (May 4, 1753). 
 94. Id. 
 95. 2 SEDGWICK, supra note 64, at 491. 
 96. 27 H.C. JOUR. 926 (July 1, 1757). 
 97. See 1 BASIL WILLIAMS, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM PITT, EARL OF CHATHAM 290 (1913) 
(noting that Pitt stood for the Okehampton seat in December 1756, having vacated his previous 
seat of Aldborough by becoming secretary of state). 
 98. Id. at 323–24 & 324 n.1. Pitt did not automatically vacate his seat upon becoming prime 
minister because the position of prime minister was then unknown to the law—from a legal 
standpoint, the prime minister was simply a secretary of state, an office that Pitt had already 
held when elected to the Okehampton seat. See F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 396 (photo. reprint 1963) (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1908) (noting that, “to this 
day the law knows no such person” as a prime minister). The prime minister was not mentioned 
in a statute until 1917. See O. HOOD PHILLIPS ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW 358 (8th ed. 2001). Because Pitt’s legal status as a Crown officer had not changed, his seat 
was not vacated under the 1705 and 1707 acts. See supra text accompanying note 55. Thus, to 
switch seats in 1757, Pitt had to apply for and receive the stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds. 
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By the end of the 1750s, accepting a stewardship had become the 
usual way of leaving the House of Commons, and the Chiltern 
Hundreds quickly became the stewardship used for this purpose.99 
Indeed, it is still the case that members may resign only by accepting a 
Crown stewardship,100 and “Chiltern Hundreds” has passed into 
common parlance.101 As is the case with all Crown powers of the type 
that Bagehot labeled “efficient,”102 the power of granting the Chiltern 
Hundreds now actually resides with the ministry of the day—in this 
case, it resides with the chancellor of the exchequer.103 
Crucially, however, the granting of the Chiltern Hundreds 
remained discretionary for quite some time. Indeed, the Chiltern 
Hundreds “were regarded, like other patronage, as something to 
which the opponents of the Government had no claim.”104 Thus, in 
1774, when Nathaniel Bayly, who had opposed the government on 
sensitive issues dealing with the increasingly rebellious American 
colonies,105 sought the Chiltern Hundreds in order to stand for a 
different seat, Lord North (who was, at the time, both chancellor of 
 
 99. See Kemp, supra note 23, at 208–10 (noting the growing use of the stewardship in the 
second half of the eighteenth century). 
 100. In contemporary Britain, the stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds and the 
stewardship of the Manor of Northstead are granted alternatingly to members who wish to 
resign. For a list of members who accepted these offices between 1970 and 2008, see U.K. 
HOUSE OF COMMONS INFO. OFFICE, supra note 83, at app. B. 
 101. See, e.g., G.K. CHESTERTON, ALARMS AND DISCURSIONS 155–59 (1910) (describing 
the author’s fantasy of running for Parliament, taking the Chiltern Hundreds, and then 
demanding to exercise the duties of the office); 1 ANTHONY TROLLOPE, PHINEAS FINN, THE 
IRISH MEMBER 39–42 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1868) (telling the story of Phineas Finn, a 
young member of Parliament, contemplating taking the Chiltern Hundreds); Editorial, A Celeb 
for All Seasons, TIMES (London), Jan. 7, 2006, at 21 (noting member of Parliament George 
Galloway’s performance on the Big Brother reality television show and suggesting that 
“[p]erhaps Celebrity [Big Brother] is the modern equivalent of the Chiltern Hundreds for [the] 
Respect [Party],” of which Galloway is the most high-profile member); Andrea Felsted, 
Chairman Norris Castigated for Jarvis ‘Shambles’, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 15, 2004, at 21 
(reporting on an investigator telling the chairman of the Jarvis company that the chairman 
“could not be trusted with the Chiltern Hundreds, let alone with Jarvis”). 
 102. See WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 7–11 (Miles Taylor ed., New 
York, Oxford Univ. Press 2001) (1867) (differentiating the dignified, or ceremonial, aspects of 
the Constitution from the efficient, or functional, aspects, and locating the dignified aspects in 
the Monarch and the efficient aspects in the government of the day). 
 103. 3 ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 84, at 100. 
 104. 1 PORRITT, supra note 25, at 245. 
 105. See 2 LEWIS NAMIER & JOHN BROOKE, THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1754–1790, at 67–
68 (1964) (noting Bayly’s history of siding with the parliamentary opposition, including on 
matters of America policy). 
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the exchequer and prime minister) simply refused.106 North again used 
the Chiltern Hundreds for partisan advantage in 1779, when John 
Glynn died, thus necessitating a by-election for his seat in Middlesex. 
Two members of the House sought the Chiltern Hundreds in order to 
stand for the Middlesex seat; North granted it only to the member 
sympathetic to the government, and he was returned for Middlesex.107 
Indeed, the Chiltern Hundreds were denied as late as the mid-
nineteenth century. The 1841 elections were marked by allegations of 
bribery, leading to petitions challenging the seating of the returned 
members.108 To escape investigation by a parliamentary committee, 
members struck “corrupt compromises,” under which they agreed to 
apply for the Chiltern Hundreds and not run in the resulting by-
elections; in return, the challengers, who would then stand for the 
seats unopposed, would withdraw their petitions.109 After several of 
these “compromises” had been effectuated, the government caught 
on, and Viscount Chelsea’s application for the Chiltern Hundreds, as 
part of a corrupt compromise, was denied.110 Since 1775, efforts have 
been repeatedly made to introduce a regularized system of 
withdrawal from the House of Commons, but they have consistently 
been defeated.111 
In short, resignation from the House of Commons has always 
been a concept foreign to British law. Parliamentary service was seen 
first as a royal duty, then as a republican one. Since the early 
eighteenth century, members have been able to leave the House by 
accepting a royal office of trust or profit. Since the middle of the 
eighteenth century, the primary office used for this purpose has been 
the stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds. However, for a long time, 
the Chiltern Hundreds were not granted as a matter of course. And 
even when taking the Chiltern Hundreds later became common, it 
was seen as necessary to preserve the principle that leaving the House 
of Commons was a matter of grace. Indeed, during the crucial period 
of American constitutional development, the British practice was 
clear: no member had a right to resign from the legislature. 
 
 106. 18 WILLIAM COBBETT, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 416–18 (London, 
Hansard 1813); 1 PORRITT, supra note 25, at 245–46. 
 107. 1 PORRITT, supra note 25, at 247. 
 108. Kemp, supra note 23, at 212. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 213. 
 111. See Betty Kemp, Resignation from the House of Commons, 6 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 
211, 214–15 (1952) (summarizing the history of such attempts). 
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II.  PRECONSTITUTIONAL AMERICAN PRACTICE 
A. Colonial Practice 
Evidence on how members left American colonial legislatures is 
scant, but the available information suggests that colonial 
representatives had no more right to resign their offices than did 
members of the House of Commons. As a general matter, the 
colonial assemblies tended to model themselves after the House of 
Commons, especially on matters relating to their privileges and 
procedures.112 As Professor Greene has noted, colonial legislators 
looked to English sources for “a whole set of generalized and specific 
institutional imperatives for representative bodies, a particular 
pattern of behavior for their members, and a concrete program of 
political action.”113 
Thus, for example, a 1706 Pennsylvania law provided an 
automatic fine for “any person or persons so chosen and returned to 
serve . . . [who] shall be absent from the service for which he or they 
shall be so elected . . . unless his or their excuse for such absence shall 
be allowed of by the Assembly.”114 Note that the fine applies to 
anyone “chosen and returned”—that is, anyone “elected.” It does not 
seem to have mattered whether or not the person wanted to serve. 
Indeed, the same act provided for a by-election whenever “any 
person so chosen and returned . . . shall happen to die or be willfully 
absent, or by vote of the House be disabled to sit or serve in 
Assembly.”115 In other words, the statute recognized the possibility 
that legislators might willfully absent themselves from their duties, 
and it accordingly provided a means for replacing them. But so far 
was this from a right to resign that it also made such behavior 
fineable. 
Similarly, a 1715 North Carolina law provided that 
 
 112. See J.R. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 31 (1971) (noting that colonial “[a]ssemblies adopted for themselves the 
theory of the British House of Commons and modelled [sic] themselves on its precedents and 
procedures”). 
 113. JACK P. GREENE, NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES: ESSAYS IN COLONIAL POLITICAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 197 (1994). 
 114. Act to Ascertain the Number of Members of Assembly and to Regulate the Election, 
1705/06, reprinted in 2 FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
1164, 1167 (W. Keith Kavenagh ed., 1973) (emphasis added). 
 115. Id. 
CHAFETZ.DOC 10/31/2008  1:22:57 PM 
2008] LEAVING THE HOUSE 197 
whatsoever representative, so elected as aforesaid, shall fail in 
making his personal appearance and giving his attendance at the 
Assembly precisely at the day limited by the writ or on the day 
appointed for the meeting of the biennial Assembly . . . shall be 
fined for every day’s absence during the sitting of the Assembly, 
unless by disability or other impediment to be allowed by the 
Assembly, twenty shilling, to be seized by a warrant from the 
Speaker.116 
Again, note that the fine was for anyone who had been elected 
and failed to appear. Refusal of the seat would have to be “allowed 
by the Assembly” if the member did not wish to be fined. A Maryland 
law of the same year provided fines for any “elected” delegates who 
failed to “attend at the time and place of the meeting of such 
assembly, . . . unless upon sufficient excuse to be admitted by the 
house of delegates their absence be dispensed with.”117 
A 1683 New York law provided for by-elections in the case of 
“death or removal of any of the said representatives”118—those 
apparently being the only means contemplated of vacating a seat. A 
1721 South Carolina statute provided for by-elections if a legislator 
“should die or depart this province, or refuse to qualify him or 
themselves as in this act directed, or be expelled by the said House of 
Commons.”119 Refusal to qualify meant refusal to take the requisite 
oath120—thus, a member of the South Carolina House of Commons, 
like a member of the British House of Commons,121 could refuse a 
seat by refusing to take the oath. But members who had already 
taken the oath, or members who felt honor bound to swear that they 
were “duly qualified to be chosen and serve as a member of the 
 
 116. Act Relating to the Biennial and Other Assemblies and Regulating Elections and 
Members in North Carolina (1715), reprinted in 3 FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL AMERICA, 
supra note 114, at 2009, 2010. 
 117. Act Directing the Manner of Electing and Summoning Delegates and Representatives 
to Serve in Succeeding Assemblies and for Ascertaining the Expenses of the Councilors, 
Delegates of Assembly, and Commissioner of the Provincial and County Courts of this Province 
(1715), reprinted in 2 FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL AMERICA, supra note 114, at 1030, 1031. 
 118. Charter of Liberties and Privileges of the Inhabitants of New York and Its 
Dependencies, October 30, 1683, reprinted in 2 FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL AMERICA, supra 
note 114, at 1051, 1052. 
 119. Act to Ascertain the Manner and Form of Electing Members to Represent the 
Inhabitants of This Province in the Commons House of Assembly, 1721, reprinted in 3 
FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL AMERICA, supra note 114, at 1980, 1982–83. 
 120. See id. at 1982 (noting that each person must be qualified before swearing an oath). 
 121. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
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Commons House of Assembly . . . according to the true intent and 
meaning of this act,”122 would have no way of vacating their seats. 
New Jersey seems to have had a similar rule. In 1770, John 
Ogden, a member of the colonial legislature from Essex, had to sell 
all of his property to pay his debts, thus putting him below the 
property requirement for legislative service.123 He thus sought and 
received permission from the house to resign.124 The house’s granting 
him permission to resign, however, “was disputed by the governor 
and council on the ground that the resignation of a member had no 
precedent in parliament, while the house insisted that this made no 
difference as the decision of such questions lay wholly with the 
representatives.”125 We thus see a clash between the parliamentary 
privilege of each house to regulate its own composition126 and the 
Crown’s stance that only it could excuse a legislator from service.127 
Importantly, however, no one claimed that the decision was Ogden’s 
alone. 
It should be noted that the New Jersey Assembly had good 
reason to think that it, rather than the governor or council, should be 
the authority to allow or deny a member’s request to give up his seat. 
It is true, as we have seen,128 that the power of granting the Chiltern 
Hundreds to members of the House of Commons lay with the 
chancellor of the exchequer, a Crown official. And it is true that the 
 
 122. Act to Ascertain the Manner and Form of Electing Members to Represent the 
Inhabitants of This Province in the Commons House of Assembly, 1721, reprinted in 3 
FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL AMERICA, supra note 114, at 1980, 1982. 
 123. MARY PATTERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN 
COLONIES 166 (1943). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 166–67. 
 126. See CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 144–61 (tracing the history of parliamentary 
jurisdiction over election and qualifications disputes); POLE, supra note 112, at 505 (“Each 
colonial Assembly made itself in the image of the British House of Commons. It quickly 
established control over that vital factor, its own composition, claiming as the Commons had 
done under James I the power to judge the credentials of its own members.”). 
 127. Here, the royal governor and his council stood as the Crown’s representatives, much as 
the chancellor of the exchequer did in granting the Chiltern Hundreds. Colonial legislatures, it 
should be noted, had incompatibility rules similar to those in place in Britain. See, e.g., JACK P. 
GREENE, THE QUEST FOR POWER: THE LOWER HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY IN THE SOUTHERN 
ROYAL COLONIES, 1689–1776, at 187–89 (1963) (noting the exclusion of certain royal 
officeholders (“placemen”) from the colonial assembly in Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia); 
ELMER I. MILLER, THE LEGISLATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF VIRGINIA: ITS INTERNAL 
DEVELOPMENT 56 (1907) (“As a rule a burgess could not hold any other office during his term 
as burgess.”). 
 128. See supra Parts I.B–C. 
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colonial governor and council were also appointed by the Crown. But, 
as we have also seen,129 by the mid-eighteenth century, Crown officers 
were in fact answerable to Parliament.130 Members of Parliament who 
wished to leave the House thus sought permission from someone 
answerable to the House. Colonial governors, however, were not 
responsible to colonial legislatures.131 Allowing Crown officials to 
interfere in the composition of colonial legislatures thus violated the 
hard-won parliamentary privilege of a house to regulate its own 
composition132 in a way that allowing Crown officials (who are in fact 
answerable to the House) to interfere in the composition of the 
House of Commons does not. Thus colonial—and, as we shall soon 
see, state and national—legislatures asserted that they had the right 
to determine when and how their members could leave their seats. 
B. State Practice, 1776–1789 
The states in the formative years between independence and the 
drafting of the federal Constitution tended to follow the same 
practices as their colonial predecessors. The 1776 Pennsylvania 
Constitution provided for filling legislative “vacancies” by “certain 
and regular elections,”133 without specifying how those vacancies 
could come about. It specifically provided, however, that members of 
the supreme executive council,134 executive and judicial officers,135 and 
justices of the peace136 could resign. The omission of any mention of 
resignation for legislators, when it was specifically provided for in the 
 
 129. See supra text accompanying notes 102–03. 
 130. See MAITLAND, supra note 98, at 395–96 (noting that the principle of common 
ministerial responsibility to Parliament dates from the Walpole administration (1721–42)); see 
also MUNRO, supra note 49, at 56 (“Every Prime Minister since Walpole has been a member of 
either the House of Commons or the House of Lords, and we may say that there is another well 
established convention to that effect, which has ensured that governments have been 
responsible to Parliament.”). 
 131. See POLE, supra note 112, at 29 (“[T]he Governor, whether royal or proprietary, stood 
not only as the ‘executive’ in a ‘mixed’ form of government but represented an interest and a 
point of view that were not based in the colony in which he held his appointment.”); see also id. 
at 529 (“The monarchical element [in the colonies] was provided by the presence and very real 
power of the royal Governor—or the proprietary one, in Pennsylvania . . . .”). 
 132. See CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 144–61; see also supra text accompanying notes 26–27. 
 133. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. I, § 6, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND 
COLONIES 3083 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1906) [hereinafter THORPE]. 
 134. Id. art. II, § 19, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 133, at 3086–87. 
 135. Id. art. II, § 20, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 133, at 3087–88. 
 136. Id. art. II, § 30, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 133, at 3089. 
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case of so many other offices, raises a strong presumption that it was 
not permitted for legislators,137 a presumption strengthened by the 
background British practice.138 
Indeed, an incident surrounding the calling of the Pennsylvania 
convention to ratify the proposed federal Constitution lends further 
support to the idea that resignation was impermissible in the 
Pennsylvania Assembly. On Friday, September 28, 1787, George 
Clymer introduced in the Pennsylvania Assembly a series of 
resolutions calling for a ratification convention.139 The timing of the 
resolutions was important, as the third and final session of the 
Eleventh General Assembly of Pennsylvania was due to expire the 
next day, and a new assembly would be elected the next month.140 The 
first resolution, which expressed the Assembly’s general desire to call 
a convention, was considered the morning it was introduced and 
passed by a vote of forty-three to nineteen.141 The Assembly then 
adjourned until that afternoon without voting on the second 
resolution, which specified the date and procedures for electing 
delegates to the convention.142 When it reconvened, the nineteen 
members who voted against the first resolution did not attend, and 
the Assembly was left one member short of a quorum.143 The 
Assembly sent its sergeant at arms to “collect the absent members,”144 
but they refused to appear.145 The next day, another member refused 
to attend, leaving the Assembly two members short of a quorum.146 
The sergeant, accompanied by a clerk, was sent out to find the absent 
members, and, with the aid of private citizens, forcibly brought two of 
them to the legislative chambers.147 One of the forcibly detained 
members, James M’Calmont, sought permission to be excused from 
 
 137. See supra note 6 (discussing the expressio unius canon of interpretation). 
 138. See supra Part I. 
 139. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 65–66 
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). 
 140. Id. at 54. 
 141. Id. at 66–67. 
 142. Id. Herrington speculates that it adjourned for lunch in what he terms “an inexplicable 
parliamentary blunder.” Matthew J. Herrington, Popular Sovereignty in Pennsylvania, 1776–
1791, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 575, 603 (1994). 
 143. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 139, at 95. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. at 96–97 (reciting the dialogue between the Speaker and the sergeant). 
 146. Id. at 103. 
 147. Id. at 103–04, 110 n.1. 
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the House,148 but, after lengthy debate,149 it was “determined almost, if 
not quite, unanimously, in the negative.”150 With a quorum thus 
assembled, the Assembly passed the resolution calling the ratifying 
convention.151 
A quorum of the Pennsylvania Assembly consisted of “two-
thirds of the whole number of members elected”152—that is, the 
denominator would remain the same even if a seat were vacant.153 
Given that the Assembly was to be dissolved the next day, a member 
would have had nothing to lose by resigning, and a resignation, if 
effective, would have prevented the quorum that M’Calmont and 
others sought to prevent. Yet resignation was never even mentioned 
as a possibility, strongly suggesting that it simply was not an option. 
Resignation, like a temporary withdrawal from the Assembly, 
required the permission of the Assembly, permission which was 
unlikely to be forthcoming in those circumstances. 
Like the Pennsylvania Constitution, the 1776 Virginia 
Constitution provided that each house of the legislature should issue 
writs for filling “intermediate vacancies,”154 without specifying what 
could cause those vacancies. However, the document also explicitly 
provided for filling vacancies caused by resignation in the case of 
judges, court clerks, the secretary of state, and the attorney general,155 
again giving rise to an expressio unius–type argument.156 
The 1778 South Carolina Constitution allowed the legislative 
houses to issue writs for legislative vacancies “occasioned by death.”157 
Moreover, it directed the houses to set specific days for filling 
vacancies created if “any parish or district shall neglect to elect a 
 
 148. See id. at 104. 
 149. See id. at 104–09. 
 150. Id. at 109. 
 151. Id. Professor Ackerman concludes from all this that “[t]he threads of political 
legitimacy were visibly beginning to unravel.” 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
TRANSFORMATIONS 56 (1998). Although a full discussion of that point is beyond the scope of 
this Article, it should be apparent from what has been said thus far that forcing unwilling 
members to attend was an acceptable and accepted part of legislative procedure. 
 152. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. II, § 10, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 133, at 3085. 
 153. For a discussion of the denominator problem in quorum rules, see generally John 
Bryan Williams, How to Survive a Terrorist Attack: The Constitution’s Majority Quorum 
Requirement and the Continuity of Congress, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1025, 1037–67 (2006). 
 154. VA. CONST. of 1776, art. II, para. 27, reprinted in 7 THORPE, supra note 133, at 3816. 
 155. Id. art. II, paras. 35–36, reprinted in 7 THORPE, supra note 133, at 3817. 
 156. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 157. S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XVIII, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 133, at 3253. 
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member or members on the day of election, or in case any person 
chosen a member of either house shall refuse to qualify and take his 
seat as such, or die, or depart the State.”158 Additionally, holding 
certain state offices and service as a religious minister were made 
incompatible with service in the legislature.159 None of these 
provisions, it should be noted, encompasses the resignation of a seat 
already held. Again, this omission is particularly telling in light of the 
explicit provision for the resignation of the governor.160 
The 1777 New York Constitution had no provision at all for 
filling legislative vacancies. It did, however, provide for filling 
vacancies occasioned by the resignation of the governor or lieutenant 
governor.161 Similarly, the 1777 Vermont Constitution allowed the 
filling of vacancies created by the resignation of state “officers”162 but 
said nothing about filling legislative vacancies.163 The 1786 Vermont 
Constitution allowed for the replacement of “officers” whose 
positions were vacant because of “death or otherwise”164 but still said 
nothing about filling legislative vacancies. 
Most of the remaining early state constitutions neither said nor 
implied anything about resigning from the state legislature. Some had 
provisions for filling vacancies without any suggestion as to how those 
vacancies could come about;165 others had both vacancy and 
incompatibility provisions but did not suggest what else might lead to 
such vacancies;166 still others had vacancy provisions whose scope was 
unclear.167 
 
 158. Id. art. XIX. 
 159. Id. arts. XX–XXI. 
 160. Id. art. VIII, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 133, at 3249. 
 161. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, arts. XX–XXI, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 133, at 2633. 
 162. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 2, § XVIII, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 133, at 3745. 
 163. It is clear that “officers” does not apply to members of the General Assembly. See id. 
ch. 2, § XX (“Every officer of State, whether judicial or executive, shall be liable to be 
impeached by the General Assembly . . . .”). 
 164. VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. 2, § 11, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 133, at 3756. 
 165. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 5, reprinted in 1 THORPE, supra note 133, at 563. 
 166. See GA. CONST. of 1777, arts. VII, XVII, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra note 133, at 779, 
780; N.C. CONST. of 1776, arts. X, XXV–XXXIII, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 133, at 
2790–91, 2792–93. New Jersey had only an incompatibility provision—and an odd one at that. It 
provided that anyone holding an executive or judicial office had to give it up upon election to 
the legislature, rather than vice versa. See N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XX, reprinted in 6 THORPE, 
supra note 133, at 2598. 
 167. See MASS. CONST. of 1780 pt. 2, ch. 1, § 2, art. IV, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 
133, at 1897 (providing for the filling of “all vacancies in the senate, arising by death, removal 
out of the state, or otherwise”). The Massachusetts Constitution also has an incompatibility 
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One state, however, did allow its legislators to resign. The 1776 
Maryland Constitution provided that 
on refusal, death, disqualification, resignation, or removal out of this 
State of any Delegate, or on his becoming Governor, or member of 
the Council, a warrant of election shall issue by the Speaker, for the 
election of another in his place; of which ten days’ notice, at least, 
(excluding the day of notice, and the day of election) shall be 
given.168 
Another clause allowed for the resignation of state senators.169 It 
is important to note that the Maryland Constitution was explicit 
about the possibility of legislative resignation. Given that a right to 
resign from the legislature would have been novel at English law and 
does not seem to have existed in the colonies or the other states, it 
would have to be spelled out explicitly for it to exist at all.170 
C. Practice in the Continental Congress under the Articles of 
Confederation 
The understanding that legislators had no individual right to 
resign seems to have carried over into the Continental Congress as 
well. The Articles of Confederation provided for a unicameral 
Congress to which each state could send between two and seven 
members.171 Each state, however, had only one vote,172 and delegates’ 
salaries and expenses were to be paid by their state.173 The delegates 
were “annually appointed, in such manner as the legislature of each 
state shall direct,”174 and the state could, at any time, recall a delegate 
and send another in his stead.175 Moreover, no one could serve as a 
 
clause. Id. pt. 2, ch. 6, art. II. The New Hampshire Constitution, which was patterned on the 
Massachusetts, contained an identical vacancy provision. See N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. 2, para. 
14 (Senate), reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra note 133, at 2460. 
 168. MD. CONST. of 1776, art. VII, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 133, at 1692. 
 169. Id. art. XIX, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 133, at 1694. 
 170. See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 921, 925 (1992) (arguing that interpretation does and should favor continuity over change 
in legal regimes and that a clear legislative statement is needed to overcome the presumption in 
favor of continuity). 
 171. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V, para. 2 (U.S. 1781). 
 172. Id. art. V, para. 4. 
 173. Id. art. V, para. 3. 
 174. Id. art. V, para. 1. 
 175. Id. 
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delegate for more than three years in any six-year period.176 The 
Articles were, however, silent on the question of members’ 
resignations. 
Service in the Continental Congress does not seem to have been 
an altogether pleasant experience,177 and the Congress frequently had 
trouble mustering the quorum of seven states required to transact 
business.178 There did seem to be a general belief, however, that 
members had no right to absent themselves, even if the Congress had 
trouble enforcing that principle. In 1786, a congressional committee 
reported that, “a delegate having taken his seat in Congress, has no 
right to withdraw himself without permission obtained either from 
Congress or the state he represents.”179 That provision of the 
committee’s report was not agreed to by the Congress, with five states 
voting for it, three voting against, and four states divided.180 It should 
be noted, however, that of the thirty delegates voting, eighteen voted 
affirmatively and twelve negatively.181 It thus seems fair to say that a 
substantial majority of the delegates believed they had no right to 
withdraw.182 
 
 176. Id. art. V, para. 2. 
 177. See JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE 
HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 220 (1979) (noting the “persistent turnover” in the 
Congress and attributing it to the fact that members “disliked the burdens Congress imposed 
and preferred to be at home”). 
 178. Id. at 355 (“From the time of its retreat to Princeton until the very demise of the 
confederation, Congress struggled almost constantly to maintain the quorum of seven states 
required by the Articles.”). 
 179. 30 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 408 (John C. 
Fitzpatrick ed., 1934). 
 180. Id. at 409. 
 181. Id. 
 182. It should also be noted that the Continental Congress was, in important ways, very 
different than the House of Commons, the colonial legislatures, or state legislatures. The 
“United States” created by the Articles of Confederation was more akin to “an alliance, a multi-
lateral treaty of sovereign nation-states” than it was to a nation-state. AKHIL REED AMAR, 
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 25 (2005). Naturally, the Congress under such a 
scheme played a very different role than a national or subnational legislature would. Id. at 27. It 
has been noted both that the Continental Congress “acted less as a legislature than as an 
executive council,” id. at 57, and that it had more in common with the General Assembly of the 
modern United Nations than with the American Congress under the Constitution, see 
CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 165. It is possible that those delegates who voted against the 
provision to prohibit withdrawing simply did not see themselves as members of a legislature like 
the House of Commons or state or colonial assemblies and therefore did not understand their 
conduct to be governed by the rules that governed such bodies. 
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The behavior of elected delegates further supports this 
observation. As Professor Rakove has noted, 
The republican values of the Revolution did not permit 
conscientious leaders casually to reject an appointment to office 
merely because it was inconvenient. Republicanism not only 
glorified the individual who risked private interest for the public 
weal, it also bestowed on the act of election the sovereign imprint of 
the popular will.183 
Indeed, quite a number of delegates served in the Continental 
Congress against their wishes.184 Those who did wish to resign in the 
middle of their service had to “ask leave to Retire,” as North 
Carolina delegate John Williams did in 1779.185 
*          *          * 
We have thus seen that preconstitutional American legislatures, 
with only one exception, followed the British rule that legislative 
service was a duty and that it therefore could not be resigned as a 
matter of right. The one exception we have seen—in the Maryland 
state constitution—was explicitly spelled out, probably precisely 
because it was understood to be exceptional. We have also seen that, 
as this practice made its way across the Atlantic, it altered subtly. 
Rather than seeking permission from Crown officials to resign, 
American colonial legislators sought permission from their houses. 
After the Revolution, it continued to be sought, not from state 
governors, but from legislative houses. And, as the next Part argues, 
this was the scheme envisioned under the Constitution, as well. 
III.  THE CONSTITUTION 
The Constitution provides that, “[w]hen vacancies happen in the 
[House] Representation from any State, the Executive Authority 
thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.”186 In 
contrast, “if Vacancies happen [in the Senate] by Resignation, or 
otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the 
Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next 
 
 183. RAKOVE, supra note 177, at 232; see also id. at 233 (“Attendance at Congress was thus 
an obligation to be discharged, not an ambition to be fulfilled.”). 
 184. See id. at 232–36 (discussing a number of such delegates). 
 185. Id. at 234. 
 186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4. 
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Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.”187 
The word “resignation” is used in describing the creation of vacancies 
in the presidency and vice presidency, as well.188 The text of the House 
Vacancies Clause is silent about resignations; the question for the 
interpreter, then, is how pregnant a silence this is. 
A. Drafting and Ratification 
The Philadelphia Convention did, in fact, consider constitutional 
language that would have given representatives a right to resign. 
Virginia delegate Edmund Randolph, a member of the Committee of 
Detail, produced a “draft sketch” of a constitution,189 which provided 
for filling “[v]acancies [in the lower house of the legislature caused] 
by death disability or resignation.”190 For the Senate, the sketch simply 
provided a placeholder reading “Vacancies,”191 presumably because it 
was intended to be identical to the provision for the lower house. 
Randolph’s sketch, including this wording, was taken up by the 
Committee of Detail,192 but that was the last time in the Convention 
that this wording appeared. Several subsequent drafts in the 
Committee of Detail mentioned vacancies in the House of 
Representatives without suggesting how those vacancies could arise 
and said nothing at all about Senate vacancies.193 
The draft reported by the Committee of Detail to the full 
Convention provided that “[v]acancies in the House of 
Representatives shall be supplied by writs of election from the 
executive authority of the State, in the representation from which it 
shall happen,”194 and that “[v]acancies [in the Senate] may be supplied 
by the Executive until the next meeting of the Legislature.”195 There 
 
 187. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 188. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (president); id. amend. XXV, § 1 (same); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (vice 
president). 
 189. This sketch is reproduced in SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 183–93 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987). 
 190. Id. at 185. 
 191. Id. at 186. 
 192. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 137, 140, 142 (Max 
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966). 
 193. See id. at 154–55, 164–65. 
 194. Id. at 179. 
 195. Id. 
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was no mention of how those vacancies might arise. The Convention 
unanimously agreed to the provision for filling House vacancies.196 
The provision for filling Senate vacancies, however, was 
somewhat more contentious. James Wilson objected to the provision 
allowing governors to fill vacancies when the state legislature was not 
in session, but he was voted down.197 Hugh Williamson proposed a 
provision that would allow state legislatures to create their own 
procedures to fill Senate vacancies during state legislative recesses, 
but he, too, was voted down.198 There then followed a telling colloquy 
between James Madison and Gouverneur Morris: 
Mr. Madison in order to prevent doubts whether resignations could 
be made by Senators, or whether they could refuse to accept, moved 
to strike out the words after “vacancies”. & insert the words 
“happening by refusals to accept, resignations or otherwise may be 
supplied by the Legislature of the State in the representation of 
which such vacancies shall happen, or by the Executive thereof until 
the next meeting of the Legislature” 
Mr. Govr. Morris[:] this is absolutely necessary. otherwise, as 
members chosen into the Senate are disqualified from being 
appointed to any office by sect. 9. of this art: it will be in the power 
of a Legislature by appointing a man a Senator agst. his consent, to 
deprive the U.S. of his services.199 
Madison’s proposal then passed unanimously.200 Thus amended, 
the provision was accepted by the Convention,201 and these provisions 
were not discussed again. At the end of the Convention, the 
Committee of Style cleaned up the wording, such that the House 
provision read, “When vacancies happen in the representation from 
any state, the Executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election 
to fill such vacancies.”202 The Senate provision read, “[I]f vacancies 
happen by resignation, or otherwise, during the recess of the 
Legislature of any state, the Executive thereof may make temporary 
 
 196. Id. at 231. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 231–32. 
 199. Id. at 232 (footnotes omitted). This passage is Farrand’s reconstruction, combining 
elements of Madison’s notes and the Convention’s journal. I have omitted the brackets 
indicating which passages come from which sources. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 233. 
 202. Id. at 591. 
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appointments until the next meeting of the Legislature.”203 The House 
provision is unchanged in the Constitution except for capitalization.204 
The words “which shall then fill such Vacancies” were added to the 
end of the Senate provision,205 which is otherwise unchanged except 
for capitalization.206 
Note that both Madison and Morris understood it to be 
necessary (“absolutely necessary,” in Morris’s words) to explicitly 
provide for the resignation of senators; otherwise, they might be 
unable to quit their seats. Indeed, Morris even understood the 
incompatibility provision to run against executive office holding—that 
is, instead of appointment to executive office automatically vacating 
the Senate seat, holding a Senate seat would make someone ineligible 
for appointment to executive office. This seems especially troubling, 
both because of the length of a senator’s term and because of the 
method of his appointment—a state legislature could, without a 
person’s consent, prevent his appointment to, say, a cabinet position 
by appointing him to the Senate instead. 
There was also concern about a related problem—members of 
Congress resigning to accept executive positions that had been 
created (or made more lucrative) during their time in Congress.207 
George Mason argued that members should be ineligible to hold such 
positions until they had been out of Congress for at least a year; 
otherwise, “evasions may be made. The legislature may admit of 
resignations and thus make members eligible” for executive office.208 
That is, without an appropriate “waiting period,” a self-dealing 
Congress could create offices (or increase their pay) with the 
understanding that those offices would be distributed to its 
members—precisely the sort of behavior against which the 
Emoluments Clause209 is meant to guard—but only if Congress admits 
of resignations. Of course, in a situation in which Congress is acting in 
such a self-dealing manner, it may well be inclined to allow 
 
 203. Id. 
 204. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4. 
 205. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 192, at 610 n.1. 
 206. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2. 
 207. This concern is responsible for the Emoluments Clause: “No Senator or Representative 
shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the 
Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall 
have been encreased during such time . . . .” Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
 208. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 192, at 394. 
 209. U.S. CONST. art I, § 6, cl. 2. 
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resignations, but the import of Mason’s words is that this is a choice 
to be made by the house—in other situations it may choose not to 
admit of resignations. No member of the Convention challenged this 
assumption, expressed by Madison, Morris, and Mason, that, absent a 
clear statement to the contrary, resignation was up to the house, not 
the member. Moreover, despite the unanimous assent to Madison’s 
“absolutely necessary”210 (in Morris’s words) proposal to insert a 
provision allowing senators to resign, no such provision was even 
proposed for representatives. 
As scant as the materials from the Philadelphia Convention are 
regarding resignation from the House of Representatives, the post-
Convention materials are even less helpful. The issue does not appear 
to have come up at all in the state ratifying conventions211 or in the 
debates in the press.212 Moreover, the canonical early treatises on the 
Constitution have little, if anything, to say about the House Vacancies 
Clause and nothing to say about the permissibility of resignation. In 
his famous Commentaries, Justice Story, after quoting the Vacancies 
Clause,213 notes that “[t]he propriety of adopting this clause does not 
seem to have furnished any matter of discussion, either in or out of 
the convention,” approves of the mode of filling vacancies, and moves 
on.214 The Clause received even less attention from Justice Wilson,215 
St. George Tucker,216 Thomas Cooley,217 and Chancellor Kent.218 Even 
 
 210. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 192, at 232. 
 211. See THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (5 vols.). 
 212. See THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (7 vols.); THE 
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (2 vols.); THE FEDERALIST. 
 213. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 
684, at 495 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Boston, Little, Brown, 5th ed. 1891). 
 214. Id. § 685. 
 215. See JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, Part Two: Of the Constitutions of the United 
States and of Pennsylvania—Of the Legislative Department, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 
399 passim (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967) (discussing the structure of Congress without 
mentioning the provisions for filling vacancies). 
 216. See 2 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF 
REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 177 n.59 (Philadelphia, Birch & 
Small 1803) (noting only that state executives issue writs of election to fill House vacancies). 
 217. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 47 (Boston, Little, Brown 1880) (noting only that House 
vacancies “are filled as may be provided by state laws”). 
 218. See 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 207–27 (New York, Halsted 
1826) (discussing the structure of Congress without mentioning the House Vacancies Clause at 
all). 
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Thomas Jefferson, the great parliamentarian of the early Republic,219 
had nothing to say about resignations.220 
B. House versus Senate 
Does it make any sense to think that the Constitution would 
employ different standards for resignation from the House and the 
Senate? Professor Currie dismisses such a possibility in less than a 
sentence tucked away in a footnote: “there appears to be no plausible 
reason for treating the two chambers differently in this regard, and 
thus every reason to conclude that the difference in phrasing was 
accidental.”221 As we have seen,222 however, Convention delegates 
made a deliberate decision—spearheaded by luminaries James 
Madison and Gouverneur Morris—to add a mention of resignation to 
the Senate Vacancies Clause. It would be a curious accident, indeed, 
for it never to have occurred to a single delegate that the same issue 
might arise with respect to the House Vacancies Clause. And yet, as 
we have seen, not a single Convention delegate did raise this issue, 
despite the unanimous assent to Madison’s insertion of resignation 
into the Senate Vacancies Clause. Moreover, contra Currie, there are 
at least three reasons why constitutional drafters and ratifiers might 
have wanted to treat the two chambers differently in this regard: 
length of term, method of election, and perceived function. 
The first, and most straightforward, reason for distinguishing 
between the House and Senate on the question of resignation is the 
simple fact that Senate terms are three times as long as House 
terms.223 A six-year Senate term without a right to resign may have 
posed recruitment problems—after all, the new federal government 
was an experiment. Perhaps the new government would turn out to 
be a disaster, or perhaps service in the new Congress would turn out 
to be as unpleasant as service in the old (Continental) Congress had 
 
 219. See Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why 
Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha Was Wrongly 
Reasoned, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1268–69 (2005) (describing Jefferson’s prowess as a 
parliamentarian). 
 220. See Jefferson, supra note 8. 
 221. CURRIE, supra note 7, at 135 n.41. 
 222. See supra text accompanying note 199. 
 223. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (providing for a six-year Senate term); id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 
(providing for a two-year House term). 
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been.224 Indeed, during the ratification debates, even a federalist 
pamphleteer described congressional service as a burden: members of 
Congress “are taken from their professions and obliged to attend 
Congress, some of them at the distance of at least seven hundred 
miles.”225 Requiring potential senators to sign up for six-year terms—
longer than the terms of any state legislature’s upper house226—
without a right to leave if things turned bad could have prevented 
many of the nation’s brightest lights from taking a Senate seat. 
Moreover, whether or not it affected recruiting, it may simply have 
been thought inequitable to trap senators in a job they did not want 
for six years. Such concerns would have been substantially less with 
regards to a two-year House term. 
Second, and relatedly, it was more plausible that someone would 
be unwillingly elected to the Senate than to the House. Recall that, 
until the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913,227 
senators were elected by state legislatures.228 To get the number of 
popular votes necessary for election to the House, candidates would 
almost certainly have to campaign or have their friends campaign on 
their behalf. At the very least, knowledge that a candidate did not 
want to serve would surely prevent the candidate’s election to the 
House. But a cabal in the state legislature determined to remove 
someone—say, the leader of the opposition party—from the state for 
six years could simply appoint that person to the Senate. This is not 
merely idle speculation—as we have seen, Gouverneur Morris was 
concerned precisely with a situation in which a state legislature 
appoints someone to a six-year Senate term without his consent.229 
 
 224. See supra text accompanying notes 177–78 (discussing the unpleasantness of service in 
the Continental Congress). 
 225. Noah Webster, An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution, 
by a Citizen of America, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 
129, 143. 
 226. See AMAR, supra note 182, at 75 (noting that no state upper house had a term of more 
than five years). 
 227. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (providing for the direct election of senators). But cf. 
Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural Examination of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347, 1354–55 (1996) (noting that, beginning in the 
1890s, states had developed mechanisms to limit state legislatures’ discretion in choosing 
senators); William H. Riker, The Senate and American Federalism, 49 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 452, 
463–67 (1955) (discussing the mechanisms used for expressing popular preferences for senators 
before the Seventeenth Amendment). 
 228. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
 229. See supra text accompanying note 199. 
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Moreover, at the Founding, members of the House of 
Representatives were the only federal officeholders directly elected 
by the people. As a federalist pamphleteer put it, the new 
Constitution “is more a government of the people, than the present 
[Continental] Congress ever was, because, the members of Congress 
have been hitherto chosen by the legislatures of the several states. 
The proposed representatives are to be chosen ‘BY THE PEOPLE.’”230 
Or, as Madison put it, 
Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the 
rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; 
not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble 
sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the 
great body of the people of the United States.231 
With such exalted bosses, turning away from the job may have 
been perceived as especially unseemly. Or, to put it differently, 
republican obligation may be thought to bind more strongly when 
service is a direct, unmediated command of the sovereign. 
Finally, the House and Senate may be thought to have different 
functions, which justify different treatment of resignations. Although 
it is certainly the case that the Senate, unlike the Continental 
Congress,232 is a true legislative body, it is equally the case that its 
primary role in the Constitution’s bicameral scheme was the 
representation of the states’ interests. Both the equality of 
representation, without regard to population,233 and the mode of 
appointment of senators234 served to ensure that the Senate was, in 
Madison’s words, “a representation . . . of the States.”235 Hamilton 
 
 230. Plain Truth, Rebuttal to “An Officer of the Late Continental Army,” reprinted in 1 THE 
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 105, 105. 
 231. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 351 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 232. See AMAR, supra note 182, at 58 (comparing the Continental Congress—“a classic 
assemblage of ambassadors”—to the new Congress under the Constitution—“a genuine 
legislature”—and concluding that “the old Congress consisted of states’ men; the new Congress 
would consist of statesmen”). 
 233. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of 
two Senators from each state . . . .”). 
 234. See id. (providing that Senators were to be chosen by state legislatures). 
 235. THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison), supra note 231, at 357; see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 231, at 244 (“The Senate . . . will derive its 
powers from the States as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the 
principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing [Continental] Congress.”); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison), supra note 231, at 377 (noting that the appointment 
of senators by state legislatures “is recommended by the double advantage of favoring a select 
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concurred, referring to the Senate as “a direct representation” of the 
states.236 Senators, as officeholders appointed by other officeholders 
for the purpose of representing the interests of a political entity, may 
have looked just enough like ambassadors237 to warrant treating them 
like ambassadors for the purposes of resignation. In contrast, a House 
of directly elected representatives, apportioned by population, was 
fully and unmistakably a legislative body. 
This interpretation of the differing roles of the House and Senate 
is further bolstered by the practice of instruction in the early 
Republic. As Professor Riker puts it, “[e]lection by state legislatures 
implied accountability to them,”238 and the legislatures demanded this 
accountability via instructions on how to vote, a practice carried over 
from the Continental Congress.239 When a legislature had strong 
opinions about an issue pending before Congress, it would pass a 
resolution of the following form: “Be it resolved that our Senators in 
Congress are hereby instructed, and our Representatives are 
requested, to vote for . . . .”240 The difference in wording is a clear 
consequence of the differences in institutional design between the 
two houses of Congress. The House, like the state legislature, is 
elected directly by the people and ultimately answerable only to 
them.241 The Senate, on the other hand, was elected by the state 
legislature and was therefore understood to be, in a sense, the agent 
of the state legislature. Instructing one’s agent is perfectly 
appropriate. 
The problem, of course, was what to do if the senators disobeyed. 
Without the recall provision of the Articles of Confederation,242 the 
 
appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an agency in the formation of the 
federal government as must secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient link 
between the two systems”); id. at 378 (“No law or resolution can now be passed without the 
concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the States.”). 
 236. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 231, at 76. 
 237. In this regard, it is also worth noting senators’ unique role in formulating foreign policy. 
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring the Senate’s “advice and consent” for making 
treaties). 
 238. Riker, supra note 227, at 455. 
 239. Id. at 456 (“The doctrine of instructions followed naturally from political institutions 
prior to the Constitution.”). 
 240. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 241. Indeed, the Constitution requires that the electorate for seats in the House be perfectly 
coextensive with the electorate for seats in the lower house of the state legislature. U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
 242. See supra text accompanying note 175. 
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only formal sanction the legislature had was a threat not to 
reelect243—but because senators’ terms were much longer than those 
of state representatives, this was an uncertain threat: the legislative 
majority that the senators disobeyed might no longer be in power 
when the senators were up for reelection. Remarkably, however, 
senators’ sense of honor244 seems to have served to enforce 
instructions in the early Republic. Beginning with John Quincy 
Adams in 1808,245 senators who were unwilling to follow instructions 
from their state legislatures were expected to resign. Although the 
practice was not universally followed, Professor Riker counts fifteen 
such “forced resignations” (and another six “almost forced” 
resignations) between 1808 and 1854.246 
Instruction and forced resignation declined thereafter, as the 
states increasingly used mechanisms, both formal and informal, to 
gage popular sentiment in the choice of senators, thus decreasing 
senators’ sense of accountability to state legislatures.247 The practice 
of instruction ended entirely with the adoption of the Seventeenth 
Amendment.248 The use of instructions thus highlights the quasi-
ambassadorial role of senators in the early Republic, and the forcing 
of resignations when senators were unwilling to obey those 
instructions suggests another reason for treating the Senate 
differently from the House in the matter of resignations. 
Of course, none of these factors is conclusive, but collectively 
they serve to undercut Professor Currie’s suggestion that there is “no 
plausible reason”249 for treating the houses differently. Likewise, 
although the scant evidence from the drafting and ratification of the 
Constitution is not conclusive, it does support the thesis that members 
of the House of Representatives were not meant to have the right to 
resign. But the background norms from the British Parliament, 
 
 243. See Riker, supra note 227, at 457 (noting the North Carolina legislature’s refusal to 
reelect Senator Samuel Johnston to the Second Congress because of his refusal to obey 
instructions). 
 244. See generally JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE 
NEW REPUBLIC (2001) (discussing the role of honor in politics in the early Republic). 
 245. See Riker, supra note 227, at 458 (explaining how the Massachusetts state legislature 
pressured Adams to resign after he voted for the Embargo Act). 
 246. Id. at 459 n.18. 
 247. See id. at 461–67 (tracing the decline of forced resignations and the reasons for that 
decline). 
 248. See id. at 456 (“State legislatures did indeed continue until 1913 to instruct their 
senators . . . .”). 
 249. CURRIE, supra note 7, at 135 n.41. 
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carried through the colonial and state legislatures and the Continental 
Congress, are clear that members have no right to resign, and nothing 
in the Founding-era history evinces a desire to do away with those 
norms. Indeed, insofar as the founding debates address the issue at 
all, they lend support to that idea. 
IV.  CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE 
Thus far, we have seen that no right of legislators to resign has 
ever existed at English law. We have seen that the English practice 
formed a sufficiently powerful background legal norm that the only 
American jurisdiction to reject it—Maryland, in its 1776 
Constitution—did so explicitly. We have seen that the drafters of the 
Constitution operated with the assumption that, unless they made 
explicit provision for it, legislators would not have the right to resign. 
We have seen that they did make explicit provision for the 
resignation of senators; moreover, they had Randolph’s draft before 
them, which would have explicitly provided for the resignation of 
representatives, but they chose not to use that wording. All of this 
combines to suggest that members of the House of Representatives 
have no constitutional right to resign. As a constitutional matter, 
members may request the House’s permission to surrender their 
seats, but the House is not bound to give that permission. 
Curiously, however, the House itself has seen the matter 
differently almost from the beginning. 
A. Early Congressional Practice 
1. William Pinkney and John Francis Mercer.  In 1790, William 
Pinkney250 was elected to the House of Representatives from 
Maryland. However, he never took his seat, and, in September 1791, 
he sent a letter to the governor and council of Maryland seeking to 
resign his seat251 for what his nephew and biographer called “reasons 
of a prudential and private nature.”252 The governor then issued a writ 
 
 250. Pinkney would go on to become “widely acknowledged to be the foremost lawyer of his 
day.” Robert M. Ireland, William Pinkney: A Revision and Re-emphasis, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
235, 236 (1970). Pinkney represented the Bank of the United States in McCulloch v. Maryland, 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Ireland, supra, at 241–45 (discussing Pinkney’s role in the case). 
 251. See H.R. JOUR., 2d Cong., 1st Sess. 461 (Nov. 23, 1791) (reprinting the report of the 
Committee of Elections that laid out the facts). 
 252. WILLIAM PINKNEY, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM PINKNEY 21 (New York, D. Appleton & 
Co. 1853). Pinkney himself gave more details in a letter: 
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for a new election, which was won by John Francis Mercer.253 When 
Mercer sought to take his seat, the Committee of Elections was called 
upon to determine who, if anyone, was entitled to the Maryland 
seat.254 
The committee recommended seating Mercer,255 but substantial 
debate ensued on the House floor. There were, essentially, three 
positions represented. One was that, in the words of William 
Loughton Smith of South Carolina, “the vacancy which had occurred 
on this occasion could not properly be called a resignation. Mr. 
PINKNEY had never taken his seat, nor the requisite oath.”256 It is not 
altogether surprising that Smith should be a champion of this 
position—as we have seen, the South Carolinian colonial257 and state258 
legislatures, like the British House of Commons,259 allowed for the 
filling of a vacancy created by refusal to take the oath of office, 
although none of them allowed for resignation. At least one 
commentator saw this position as dispositive.260 
A second position held by some members was that, in the words 
of Hugh Williamson of North Carolina, “the Constitution 
 
  I have not been elected by the third district, whose representative it was intended 
I should be—I resided in a part of the state, whose interests, in some respects, are 
supposed to be at variance with theirs.—The legality of my election has been 
questioned.—I have not had time or opportunity to prepare my mind for the expected 
business in the continental legislature—and I have not health adequate to that degree 
of exertion which my situation would of necessity require.—On such terms I cannot 
serve. 
  Dependent altogether on my profession, my time is of the last importance to 
myself and family—nor will the loss of it, as I am circumstanced, be easily repaired. I 
am too young at the bar to intermit my professional duties for months together. In a 
word—it would be ruinous to me . . . . 
Letter from William Pinkney (Sept. 28, 1791), as reprinted in Extract of a Letter from One of the 
Representatives of This State in Congress, to His Friend in This Town, Dated Hartford County, 
Sept. 28, 1791, N.Y. J. & PATRIOTIC REG., Oct. 12, 1791, at 323 [hereinafter Extract of a Letter]. 
 253. H.R. JOUR., 2d Cong., 1st Sess. 461 (Nov. 23, 1791). 
 254. Id. at 451 (Nov. 9, 1791) (referring the matter to the committee). 
 255. Id. at 461 (Nov. 23, 1791). 
 256. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 206 (1791); see also id. at 206–07 (statement of Rep. Murray) 
(stating “several particulars to show that Mr. PINKNEY was not a member of the House 
agreeably to the Constitution”); id. at 207 (summarizing the statements of Elbridge Gerry, who 
expressed a similar sentiment). 
 257. See supra text accompanying notes 119–22. 
 258. See supra text accompanying note 158. 
 259. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
 260. See James Mercer Garnett, John Francis Mercer, Governor of Maryland, 1801 to 1803, 2 
MD. HIST. MAG. 191, 207 (1907) (“[I]t took [the House] three days to decide how [Mercer] 
should take his seat, all due to the fact that William Pinkney had never taken his seat, nor the 
oath of office.”). 
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contemplates that a member may resign.”261 Joshua Seney, a fellow 
Marylander, rather ahistorically pronounced it a “new and very 
strange declaration to say that a member had not a right to resign.”262 
He also suggested that refusing to allow the resignation would cause 
an unacceptable “inconvenience . . . to the State of Maryland”263 and 
that it could potentially affect “the privilege of every free citizen” 
who might find himself elected against his will and forced to serve.264 
Finally, he argued that “no difference did really exist” between the 
House and the Senate on the matter of resignation,265 although he 
made no attempt to explain the different wording of the Vacancies 
Clauses. 
Finally, there were members who thought that there was no right 
of resignation. William Branch Giles of Virginia made two arguments 
in this vein. First, he suggested that allowing for this sort of 
resignation would give state governors an improper level of control 
over the composition of the House: 
The constitution says, that when vacancies happen, the Executive 
may issue writs to fill up those vacancies; but it does not say that 
resignation causes a vacancy; and if the Executive in the present 
instance judges of the circumstances that cause a vacancy, he may do 
it in every instance; in which case, the members of the House may be 
reduced to hold their seats on a very precarious tenure indeed.266 
That is, if state executives, rather than the House itself, had the 
power to accept resignations, then a governor could create a vacancy 
at any point simply by declaring that the person holding the seat had 
resigned. That begins to look uncomfortably like the power of recall 
in the Articles of Confederation.267 On this point, Giles was explicitly 
seconded by Elias Boudinot of New Jersey,268 and Theodore Sedgwick 
 
 261. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 207 (1791) (statement of Rep. Williamson). 
 262. M. ST. CLAIR CLARKE & DAVID A. HALL, CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN 
CONGRESS, FROM THE YEAR 1789 TO 1834, INCLUSIVE 46 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834). 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 207 (1791) (statement of Rep. Seney). 
 266. CLARKE & HALL, supra note 262, at 45. 
 267. See supra text accompanying note 175 (noting the states’ power to recall congressional 
delegates under the Articles). 
 268. CLARKE & HALL, supra note 262, at 45. 
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of Massachusetts made a similar point.269 Giles’ second point was a 
republican and historical one: 
From recurring to the Constitution, he was of opinion that a 
resignation did not constitute a vacancy. The Constitution speaks 
only of vacancies in general, and does not contemplate one as 
resulting from a resignation. Adverting to the British House of 
Commons, he observed that in that body there could be no 
resignation. This is an established principle. The people having once 
chosen their representatives, their power ceases, and consequently 
the body to which the resignation ought to be made no longer exists. 
From the experience of the British Government in this respect, he 
argued against a deviation from this rule.270 
That is, the American representative, like the British, answers 
only to the people. A resignation made to the governor violates this 
principle. Fisher Ames of Massachusetts suggested that allowing 
resignations without the House’s consent would deprive the House of 
one of its traditional privileges: “the House, he observed, has a 
control over absent members; but if a member may resign when he 
pleases, he may do it out of the House, and withdraw himself from 
the power of the House whenever he thinks proper.”271 
Ultimately, the House agreed to the resolution offered by the 
Committee of Elections that “John Francis Mercer is entitled to take 
a seat in this House as one of the Representatives for the State of 
Maryland, in the stead of William Pinkney.”272 Mercer was seated on 
February 6, 1792.273 What remains unclear is to what extent this 
decision should be read as recognizing a broad right of members to 
resign from the House and to what extent it should be read as limited 
to the case of a member-elect who had not yet taken the oath of 
office. Recall that, even in the British House of Commons, one in 
Pinkney’s position could have triggered a vacancy by refusing to take 
the oaths.274 Moreover, at least some of the members in the debate 
seemed to consider it quite important that Pinkney had not yet taken 
the oath.275 It was thus still an open question whether the House 
 
 269. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 207 (1791) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick). 
 270. Id. at 205–06 (statement of Rep. Giles). 
 271. CLARKE & HALL, supra note 262, at 46. 
 272. H.R. JOUR., 2d Cong., 1st Sess. 461 (Nov. 23, 1791). 
 273. Id. at 502 (Feb. 6, 1792). 
 274. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
 275. See supra text accompanying notes 256–60. 
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would allow a member who had already begun to serve to resign as a 
matter of right. 
2. Joshua Seney and William Hindman.  On December 6, 1792, 
the Speaker “laid before the House a letter from Joshua Seney, one 
of the Members for the State of Maryland, stating his acceptance of 
an appointment in the Judiciary Department of the said State, which 
disqualifies him from a seat in this House.”276 This was not the sort of 
appointment that triggered the Incompatibility Clause,277 which meant 
that Seney would actually have to resign from the House. 
Unfortunately, the Annals of Congress offer only a tantalizing hint of 
the debate. On December 7, 
[t]he Letter from Mr. SENEY, containing his resignation was again 
read, and a motion made to refer the same to a committee; some 
debate ensued on this motion, in which the question was started how 
far it was in the power of a member of the House to vacate his seat; 
the solution of this, it was said, would involve a lengthy discussion of 
some constitutional questions; if it was the opinion of the House that 
the present case naturally included this discussion, the reference 
ought to be to a Committee of the Whole. Some gentlemen thought 
that the most simple process was to accept the resignation, and make 
entry accordingly in the Journal; a notification to be sent to the 
Executive of the State of Maryland. The motion for commitment of 
the Letter was negatived; a motion was then made that the SPEAKER 
of the House notify the Executive of the State of Maryland of a 
[vacancy in the] representation of that State, by the resignation of 
Mr. SENEY. This motion was negatived and the Letter laid on the 
table.278 
From this truncated account,279 it appears that the House debated 
where and how to debate the constitutional issues surrounding 
Seney’s resignation, and, finding themselves unable to agree, simply 
did nothing. The Journal of the House of Representatives from 
December 7 confirms that no notification was sent to the Maryland 
governor.280 The governor, however, seems to have taken matters into 
 
 276. H.R. JOUR., 2d Cong., 2d Sess. 635 (Dec. 6, 1792). 
 277. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (providing that members of Congress cannot 
simultaneously hold “any Office under the United States” (emphasis added)). 
 278. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 739–40 (1792). 
 279. This passage in the Annals is the only account of this debate that I have been able to 
find. 
 280. H.R. JOUR., 2d Cong., 2d Sess. 635 (Dec. 7, 1792). 
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his own hands: on January 23, 1793, the Speaker laid before the 
House a letter from the Maryland governor announcing that William 
Hindman had been elected to replace Seney; this letter, too, was 
ordered to lie on the table.281 One week later, Hindman “appeared, 
produced his credentials, and took his seat in the House, the oath to 
support the Constitution of the United States being first administered 
to him by Mr. Speaker, according to law.”282 There is no other 
recorded debate on the matter.283 
3. John Francis Mercer and Gabriel Duvall.  The debate over the 
first resignation from the Third Congress appears to have been even 
briefer. On May 31, 1794, the Speaker laid before the House a letter 
from the governor of Maryland announcing that John Francis 
Mercer—the same Mercer who had replaced William Pinkney after 
his resignation—had resigned and that Gabriel Duvall had been 
elected to replace him.284 The matter was referred to the Committee 
of Elections, which determined that Duvall should be seated.285 The 
House voted to do so.286 Again, the Annals provide a noticeably 
truncated account, including the tantalizing note that “[s]ome 
remarks fell from Mr. LEE respecting precedent. Mr. MERCER had 
formerly taken a seat in much the same way, in the room of Mr. 
PINKNEY.”287 It is also worth noting that, although some members 
wanted to seat Duvall without voting on the Committee of Elections’ 
report, James Madison insisted that the report be voted on.288 This 
may indicate that Madison continued to believe that a resignation was 
not effective until the House voted to accept it. 
4. Uriah Forrest and Benjamin Edwards.  After the Mercer 
resignation, the issue of resigning does not seem to have occasioned 
any floor debate at all. On January 1, 1795, the Speaker laid before 
the House a letter from Uriah Forrest, a representative from 
 
 281. Id. at 677 (Jan. 23, 1793). 
 282. Id. at 686 (Jan. 30, 1793). 
 283. After the truncated debate of December 7, the Annals also notes the letter from the 
Maryland governor, 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 835 (1793), and the seating of Hindman, id. at 853. 
One searches the intervening pages in vain, however, for any additional discussion. 
 284. H.R. JOUR., 3d Cong., 1st Sess. 192–93 (May 31, 1794). 
 285. H.R. JOUR., 3d Cong., 2d Sess. 225 (Nov. 11, 1794). 
 286. Id. at 226. 
 287. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 874 (1794). 
 288. Id. (statement of Rep. Madison). 
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Maryland, stating that he had tendered his resignation to the 
governor and that Benjamin Edwards had been elected to replace 
him. This was accompanied by a letter from the clerk of the Maryland 
council, confirming both that Forrest had resigned and that Edwards 
had been elected in his stead.289 The letters were committed to the 
Committee of Elections.290 The next day, two more letters arrived—
one from the governor, confirming that Edwards had been elected to 
replace Forrest, and the other a copy of Forrest’s letter of resignation 
to the governor.291 These, too, were referred to the committee.292 That 
same day, January 2, the committee reported a resolution to seat 
Edwards.293 The preamble to the resolution certified that Forrest had 
indeed resigned and that Edwards had indeed been elected to replace 
him;294 nowhere did it suggest any doubt as to the propriety of 
resignation. The resolution was accepted by the House295 without any 
recorded debate,296 and Edwards was immediately sworn in.297 
*          *          * 
Why did the practice of the early House diverge so sharply from 
the practice and understanding up to that point? Although the 
available sources do not allow us to pin down a reason with precision, 
it should not pass without comment that the first four members to 
resign from the House were all Marylanders. As we have seen,298 the 
Maryland Constitution was the only state constitution to provide for 
legislative resignation. The Maryland political class may simply have 
had a different conception of the role of the legislator than did the 
politicians from other states—a less republican role that allowed for 
resignation whenever convenient.299 This would help to explain why, 
 
 289. H.R. JOUR., 3d Cong., 2d Sess. 279 (Jan. 1, 1795). 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. (Jan. 2, 1795). 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 280. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 1041 (1795). 
 297. H.R. JOUR., 3d Cong., 2d Sess. 280 (Jan. 2, 1795). 
 298. See supra text accompanying notes 168–69. 
 299. Compare Extract of a Letter, supra note 252 (“I enclose my resignation, which you will 
be please [sic] to forward to the executive” (quoting William Pinkney)), with Mr. Gore’s 
Resignation, HERALD OF FREEDOM & FED. ADVERTISER, Feb. 2, 1790, at 144 (describing 
Christopher Gore’s “ask[ing] leave of the Hon. House” to give up his seat in the Massachusetts 
state legislature). 
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by the Third Congress, four Maryland representatives had resigned 
when not a single representative from any other state had, and the 
idea may have subsequently spread from those Maryland 
representatives to their colleagues.300 
B. Contemporary Congressional Practice 
1. The Resignation of Benjamin Whittemore.  Thereafter, the 
matter seems to have been settled. Members were understood to have 
the right to resign at will, and throughout the nineteenth century, they 
did so.301 Thus, in 1870, while facing an expulsion resolution for 
allegedly selling appointments to the Military and Naval Academies, 
 
 300. A series of letters between De Witt Clinton, writing on behalf of his uncle George 
Clinton, the governor of New York, and the New York congressional delegation illustrates the 
spreading of this norm. Silas Talbot, a member of the House of Representatives from New 
York, sought to resign his seat by letter to the governor. Clinton wrote, in a letter addressed to 
the entire New York delegation, that 
an important question results for consideration, which is, the constitutional tribunal 
to decide whether a vacancy happens or not, the executive authority of the state or 
the house of representatives. 
  The governor is inclined to believe from the right of the house to judge of its own 
members and from inherent power in every legislative assembly to preserve and 
perpetuate its own existence, that the proper tribunal is the house of 
representatives . . . . 
Letter from De Witt Clinton to New York Congressional Delegation (Dec. 19, 1794), in AM. 
MINERVA, Mar. 14, 1795, at 2. The delegation wrote back that, “whatever doubt might have 
been entertained on this point at the commencement of the government, the question has been 
since settled in practice . . . . [W]e beg leave to refer your Excellency to the printed Journals of 
the house of Representatives . . . .” Letter II (Jan. 1795), in AM. MINERVA, Mar. 14, 1795, at 2. 
Clinton shot back, “That precedents as to this point have existed prior to the case of Mr. Talbot 
is not believed and if they have occurred, they have escaped the Governor’s notice, who is too 
much engaged in the important duties of his office to study attentively the journals of 
Congress . . . .” Letter III (Jan. 31, 1795), in AM. MINERVA, Mar. 14, 1795, at 2. Talbot served 
out the rest of his term (which, after all, ended on March 3, 1795). 
Of course, the precedents to which the New York members were referring were the 
Maryland members’ resignations. We thus see an aberrational practice of a single state being 
introduced by that state’s representatives into Congress, leading representatives of other states 
quickly to assume that it was the norm—an assumption that surprised those familiar with 
legislative procedure in their home states. 
 301. As an example of how routinized resignation quickly became, Representative Thomas 
Oakley of New York submitted a letter of resignation on May 9, 1828. H.R. JOUR., 20th Cong., 
1st Sess. 719 (May 9, 1828). The next day, he was replaced on a committee. Id. at 720 (May 10, 
1828). On December 1, 1828, Thomas Taber, II, was seated as his replacement. H.R. JOUR., 20th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (Dec. 1, 1828). There was no debate or vote on the matter whatsoever. See 4 
REG. DEB. 2640 (May 9, 1828) (accepting Oakley’s resignation without debate); 5 id. at 95 (Dec. 
1, 1828) (beginning the new session without even noting the seating of Taber). 
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Benjamin Whittemore of South Carolina tendered his resignation.302 
Several members thought it was inappropriate to allow Whittemore 
to resign in order to escape the shame of expulsion, and two of them 
questioned the permissibility of resignation generally. Nathaniel 
Banks of Massachusetts, a former Speaker of the House, thought that 
the House will be led into great difficulty if it accepts the doctrine 
that a member can resign his seat without the consent of the House. 
No principle of parliamentary law is better established, either in 
England or in this country, than that a member of a parliamentary 
body cannot resign without the consent of that body, either 
expressed or implied.303 
The current Speaker, James Blaine, replied that “there never has 
been, as I am fortified by the opinion of the Journal clerk—there 
never has been a record of the acceptance of a resignation since the 
House was organized,”304 the implication being that no such 
acceptance was necessary. The Speaker continued, “The uniform 
practice of the House of Representatives from the foundation of the 
Government has been that when the resignation of a member has 
been handed in at the Clerk’s desk, the Chair must then cease to 
recognize him as a member.”305 However, “[i]f the House wishes to 
override that decision of the Chair, such positive action must emanate 
from the floor of the House.”306 That is, the House is not bound to 
accept a resignation, but a tendered resignation is automatically in 
effect until overtly overridden by the House. 
Henry Dawes of Massachusetts thought that the Speaker had it 
backward: when the Speaker accepts a resignation as a matter of 
course, that should be understood as acceptance by unanimous 
consent.307 When an objection is raised, however, the issue should 
presumably be put to a vote, like any other. Dawes listed what he saw 
as the baleful implications of allowing “that a member can resign 
whether the House will or not”308: 
 
 302. H.R. JOUR., 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 372–73 (Feb. 24, 1870). 
 303. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1545–46 (1870) (statement of Rep. Banks). 
 304. Id. at 1546 (statement of Rep. Blaine). 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. (statement of Rep. Dawes). 
 308. Id. 
CHAFETZ.DOC 10/31/2008  1:22:57 PM 
224 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:177 
If a member, when the Constitution clothes us with the power to 
punish a member for any offense here, can prevent us from 
discharging that duty by resigning, whether we will or not, the power 
of the House to control its own constitution is at an end. If a 
member can resign, whether the House will or not, we can be left at 
any moment without a quorum by a certain number of members 
sending papers of resignation to the desk.309 
John Bingham then raised a point of order, insisting that “the 
capacity of a member to resign has been disposed of,” and the chair 
ruled Dawes’s remarks out of order,310 putting an end to the debate 
over resignation. 
2. The Statute of 1872.  Today, it seems unlikely that even two 
members could be found to join Banks and Dawes in their stance 
against a right to resign. Federal law in effect since 1872 allows states 
to set the time for filling House vacancies, “whether such vacancy is 
caused by a failure to elect at the time prescribed by law, or by the 
death, resignation, or incapacity of a person elected.”311 This explicit 
recognition of the possibility of resignation is accompanied by a 
House practice that “[a] Member properly submits his resignation to 
an official designated by State law and simply informs the House of 
his doing so, the latter communication being satisfactory evidence of 
the resignation.”312 In short, the House has essentially concluded that 
resignation is a matter of individual right—that is, a matter for the 
member alone to decide.313 
V.  HOW SHOULD THE HOUSE TREAT RESIGNATIONS TODAY? 
What relevance does this history have for contemporary 
congressional procedure? Could House practice be changed to make 
resignation no longer a matter of right? If so, how—and, perhaps 
more importantly, why? Alternatively, if it could not or should not be 
changed, does the understanding that it was not originally meant to 
be a constitutional right hold any valuable lessons for us today? 
 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. (statements of Reps. Bingham and Blaine). 
 311. 2 U.S.C. § 8 (2006) (originally passed as part of the Apportionment Act of 1872, ch. 11, 
§ 4, 17 Stat. 28, 29 (1872)). 
 312. BROWN & JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 484. 
 313. Today, House resignations are commonplace. See supra note 1 (listing some recent 
resignations). These resignations draw no debate whatsoever in the House. 
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My contention in this Part is that there are good reasons for 
ceasing to treat resignation as a matter of right. That is to say, there 
are good reasons, sounding in republican political theory, for 
requiring members to obtain the consent of the House before quitting 
their seats. Before going into these reasons, however, it will be helpful 
to state a few preliminaries. 
First, it should be noted that the 1872 statute314 poses no bar to a 
decision by the House that resignation is not a matter of right. The 
Rules of Proceedings Clause leaves the determination of each 
chamber’s procedural rules up to that chamber.315 Any attempt to 
create House rules by legislation eliminates cameral autonomy by 
introducing bicameralism and presentment into the mix and therefore 
cannot bind the House.316 Thus, although there is no constitutional 
problem with the House’s following the 1872 statute,317 it could also 
alter the statutory scheme by a simple resolution. 
It should also be noted, however, that the reasons for treating the 
House and Senate differently with regard to resignations have 
become less salient over time, especially with the passage of the 
Seventeenth Amendment. As we have seen, there were at least three 
reasons at the Founding for distinguishing between the chambers in 
this regard.318 First, Senate terms are significantly longer than House 
terms. The strength of this reason remains undiminished. The second 
reason, however, was the possibility that someone would be elected to 
the Senate against his will by an unfriendly state legislature. The 
Seventeenth Amendment’s move to popular elections for senators319 
has made this at least as unlikely for the Senate as it is for the House. 
And third, the two chambers were understood at the Founding to 
have somewhat different functions, with the Senate looking more like 
a collection of ambassadors and the House a more popular 
 
 314. 2 U.S.C. § 8; see also supra note 311 and accompanying text. 
 315. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings . . . .”). 
 316. For more detailed elaborations of this principle, see CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 57–59; 
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, If the Judicial Confirmation Process Is Broken, Can a Statute Fix It?, 
85 NEB. L. REV. 960, 1007–10 (2007); Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act 
Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1653, 1779–87 (2002). 
 317. Indeed, because the 1872 statute was passed by the House, its scheme remains in effect 
until the House overrides it. 
 318. See supra Part III.B. 
 319. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of 
two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years . . . .”). 
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representative body. The move to popular election of senators has 
dimmed this distinction, but it has not eliminated it. For one thing, 
the states’ equality of representation in the Senate320 means that the 
Senate’s constituencies remain the states, rather than the American 
people as a whole. In contrast, representation in the House must be 
generally proportional,321 which makes the individual citizen the 
fundamental unit of representation for the House. For another, 
representatives remain significantly more numerous than senators, 
making them, in some sense, more popular representatives. 
It should also be made explicit what it would mean if the House 
were to stop allowing resignations as a matter of right. It would mean 
simply that, for a resignation to become effective, the House would 
have to vote to accept it. In many cases—for instance, when a 
member seeks to resign because of health issues—the resignation 
would most likely be accepted as a matter of course. 
But there are also countervailing considerations. Refusing to 
allow resignations might punish constituents by forcing on them an 
unwilling representative. It might also be seen as unfair to the 
representatives themselves. And it should certainly give us pause that 
it would fly in the face of over two centuries of American practice. 
With these background issues in mind, it is worth considering 
what reasons we might have today for wanting to restrict resignation 
from the House. Below, I present two paradigm cases that, I submit, 
demonstrate why such a restriction would be valuable. Although 
there may be other reasons for restricting resignation (for example, 
preventing representatives from gaming the seniority system322 or, 
possibly, preventing them from manipulating quorum counts323), these 
 
 320. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (providing that each state shall have two senators); see also id. art. V 
(providing that no constitutional amendment may deprive a state of its equal representation in 
the Senate without that state’s consent). 
 321. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (holding that the constitutional 
requirement that representatives be chosen by the people “means that as nearly as is practicable 
one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s”). 
 322. Members could time their resignations so that their successors could be elected both to 
serve out the remainder of their term and for the next term. These successors would only get a 
few days of legislative experience in the expiring term, but they would have seniority over all of 
the other entering freshmen in the next Congress. Denying such late-in-the-game retirement 
requests could prevent this outcome, as could dating members’ seniority from the beginning of 
their first full term. 
 323. The Constitution states that “a Majority of each [house] shall constitute a Quorum to 
do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to 
compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties, as each 
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two paradigm cases seem to present not only the most compelling 
reasons for rethinking the House’s position on the resignation of 
members but also the clearest view of the ways in which republican 
values are best served by such a rethinking. 
A. Punishing Members 
The first paradigm case is that of the member who resigns to 
escape some sort of punishment by the House. Expulsion from—and 
perhaps even censure by—the House carries a stigma greater than 
that of resignation, even resignation under fire. After all, the 
tendency of members to resign when facing likely expulsion324 can 
 
House may provide.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. The House currently interprets a quorum as 
“a majority of those Members sworn and living, whose membership has not been terminated by 
resignation or by House action.” BROWN & JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 733. Under this 
interpretation, resignation lowers the numerator and the denominator and therefore has no 
effect. But recent scholarship suggests that this interpretation may be wrong and that the proper 
denominator for quorum purposes is the number of seats. See Williams, supra note 153, at 1051–
64 (discussing the evolution of House quorum rules). 
If this latter interpretation is correct, then a mass resignation could deprive the House of 
a quorum. Consider the following scenario: It is November 3, 2010. The Democrats hold a two-
vote majority in the House, but there are three vacancies, so the Democrats alone are 
insufficient for a quorum. Democrats also control the Senate and the presidency. As a result of 
the previous day’s elections, however, the Republicans will assume control of the House on 
January 3, 2011. The House Democratic leadership has resolved to use its few remaining days in 
power to pass a number of controversial bills. However, in a striking display of party discipline, 
every House Republican resigns on November 4, thus preventing the assembly of a quorum 
before the beginning of the next Congress in January. This may seem farfetched, but we have 
seen that it was a worry for Representative Dawes in 1870, see supra text accompanying note 
309, and mass flight—although not mass resignation—was a worry for the Texas legislature in 
2003, see Edward Walsh, Texas Legislature Adjourns a Special Session: Governor to Call 
Members Back a 3rd Time to Force Vote on GOP Redistricting Plan, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 
2003, at A4 (describing how Texas senate Democrats blocked what they alleged was a 
gerrymandering attempt by state Republicans by leaving the state and consequently depriving 
the state senate of the required two thirds quorum). 
Note that this worry is unique to the House for two reasons. Under the Seventeenth 
Amendment, governors may, in accordance with state law, appoint replacements to fill Senate 
vacancies until a new election can be held. Thus, a few governors could stymie any attempt to 
deprive the Senate of a quorum by mass resignation. In the House, where vacancies can only be 
filled by election, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4, it would take significantly longer to fill those 
seats. Second, Senate terms are staggered. Although it might be plausible that House members 
would resign en masse in the scenario sketched above—after all, they have all either just been 
reelected, in which case they will get their seats back in two months, or they are only giving up 
two months of time in Congress anyway—it is highly unlikely that senators, many of whom 
would have two or four years remaining in their terms, would be willing to go along. 
 324. Of the eight House resignations noted in the Introduction, see supra note 1, four of 
them—Representatives Cunningham, DeLay, Foley, and Ney—resulted from behavior which 
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only be explained by a sense that resignation is preferable to 
expulsion. Indeed, this phenomenon is not limited to members of 
Congress: “You can’t fire me; I quit!” has become a popular literary 
trope.325 
Although resignation from the House does not prevent a 
censure326 (and perhaps should not prevent imprisonment by the 
House327), it clearly does prevent expulsion. Insofar as a member has 
an interest in telling the House, “You can’t fire me; I quit!”, the 
House may have an equally strong interest in replying, “You can’t 
quit; we’ve just fired you!” Indeed, we saw exactly this debate play 
out over the resignation of Benjamin Whittemore in 1870.328 
Whittemore sought to resign precisely to avoid being disciplined over 
his ethical lapses, and Henry Dawes, arguing against the right of 
resignation, told the House that “[i]f a member, when the 
Constitution clothes us with the power to punish a member for any 
offense here, can prevent us from discharging that duty by resigning, 
whether we will or not, the power of the House to control its own 
constitution is at an end.”329 We have seen a similar impulse in the 
House of Commons, where the Chiltern Hundreds was denied in the 
mid-nineteenth century to keep members from taking advantage of 
“corrupt compromises.”330 And at least one English-descended 
 
allegedly breached ethical rules to an extent that expulsion would not have been at all 
improbable. A fifth, Representative Janklow, resigned after being convicted of manslaughter. 
 325. See, e.g., Jan Battles, Bell X1 and Label ‘Agree to Part’, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Feb. 
11, 2007, at 3 (“You can’t fire us—we quit. Bell X1, Ireland’s biggest band after U2, have left 
their record company days after rumours that they were being dumped.”); Adam Bernstein, 
Oscar Brown Jr. Dies; Songwriter, Performer Had Eclectic Career, WASH. POST, May 31, 2005, 
at B7 (“‘We were really young zealots, and that went on till I got booted out of the Communist 
party when I was 30 years old, about 1956. It was one of those situations where “you can’t fire 
me, I quit!” We fell out on the race question. I was just too black to be red!’” (quoting the 
deceased, Oscar Brown, Jr.)); Harvey Blume, Alan Dershowitz, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 5, 2006, 
at E3 (summarizing Professor Alan Dershowitz’s criticism of Lawrence Summers’s resignation 
as president of Harvard as “You can’t fire me; I quit”). 
 326. See CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 93 (noting that the House’s power of punishing 
members “extends to punishing former Members for disorderly acts done while Members”). 
 327. Each house of Congress has the power to punish contempts against it and breaches of 
its privileges, whether those offenses are committed by Members or non-Members. Available 
punishments against members include expulsion, imprisonment, fine, censure or reprimand, and 
loss of seniority. See id. at 207–35; see also Josh Chafetz, Politician, Police Thyself, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 2, 2006, at A15 (arguing for an increased use of the congressional houses’ own disciplinary 
powers against their members, including the power of arrest). 
 328. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 329. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1546 (1870) (statement of Rep. Dawes). 
 330. See supra text accompanying notes 108–10. 
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legislature refused a resignation in the twentieth century for the same 
reason—in 1951, the lower house of the Indian parliament refused to 
allow a resignation when it sought, instead, to expel a member.331 
In short, although the disciplinary power of the House would 
continue to extend to actions taken by former members while in 
office, there are more—and more serious—punishment options 
available while the member remains in the House. Moreover, given 
the large number of demands on the House’s time, it may be more 
likely to take an “out of sight, out of mind” approach: why bother 
disciplining a member who is already gone? But for many ethical 
breaches, the expressive value of an explicit condemnation may be 
great—that is, the claim that a member is resigning “to spend more 
time with family” ought not to be allowed to pass without 
institutional comment. If inaction was not an option—that is, if the 
House had to vote on whether or not to accept the member’s 
resignation—it might decide that it would be just as easy (and 
considerably more cathartic) to vote instead to expel the member. 
The expressive value of such expulsions might do a lot to increase the 
public perception of congressional ethical standards.332 Moreover, the 
fact that members of the House are closer to the people and elected 
on terms of numerical equality by the people333 may make ethical 
breaches by House members especially suitable for public expressions 
of outrage, whereas ethical breaches by senators, who are more 
removed from the people and whose unit of representation remains 
the state, may be less so. 
Note that this rationale for refusing to allow resignations as a 
matter of right does not presuppose that members would actually be 
kept in the House against their will. Rather, it changes the terms of 
the bargaining over how they leave the House. Under existing rules, 
individual members hold all of the power, as the decision is entirely 
theirs. But the change proposed here would shift power to the 
 
 331. See Madhu Dandavate, The Future of Parliamentary Democracy, in FIFTY YEARS OF 
INDIAN PARLIAMENT 366, 371 (G.C. Malhotra ed., 2002) (discussing the H.C. Mudgal expulsion 
and noting that his attempt to resign was considered an “attempt to circumvent the effects of the 
motion expelling him from the House . . . which constituted a contempt of the House and 
aggravated his offence”); see also ARUN PROKAS CHATTERJEE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES 
IN INDIA 59 (1971) (discussing the same case). 
 332. See Josh Chafetz, Comment, Cleaning House: Congressional Commissioners for 
Standards, 117 YALE L.J. 165, 166–67 (2007) (arguing that the public perception of 
congressional action against corruption is in the public interest). 
 333. See supra text accompanying note 321. 
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House—it would allow the House as an institution to dictate the 
terms on which members leave. More importantly, however, it would 
constrain the House in dictating those terms: if members had to vote 
either way in a floor vote, then they would have to explain why they 
voted to let an obviously corrupt member walk away without any sort 
of condemnation. In short, members under an ethical cloud who 
wanted to leave the House would still leave the House—but their 
colleagues would be forced to contemplate whether the voters 
consider the ethical transgressions of that member sufficiently 
egregious to demand institutional comment by the House. The 
expressive costs of allowing a member to resign for spurious reasons 
would thereby be internalized by the House rather than externalized 
onto the polity. 
B. Duty of Service 
The second paradigm case is that of members who seek to resign 
because they are simply sick of the job or wish to take jobs that are 
more lucrative or personally convenient. The recent resignation of 
former Speaker Dennis Hastert334 fits this bill—shortly before he 
announced that he was stepping down, an anonymous Republican 
aide told CNN that “I think he is just done with being a member of 
Congress.”335 That is to say, the job ceased to interest him, so, rather 
than serve out the remainder of his two year commitment, he quit.336 
Whether or not we allow our representatives to resign says 
something about how we see our government and how our 
representatives see their relationship with us. “The truth is,” Plato 
argued, “that the city where those who rule are least eager to do so 
will be the best governed and the least plagued by dissension.”337 The 
ruling class must therefore be trained to approach ruling as “an 
 
 334. See Parsons & Pearson, supra note 1. 
 335. Congressional Sources: Hastert Won’t Serve Out His Term, CNN.COM, Oct. 18, 2007, 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/10/18/hastert/index.html. 
 336. In the same vein, one could also consider Representative Albert Wynn of Maryland, 
who, as the New York Times noted, “lost to a primary challenger in February and promptly 
announced that he would retire in June—the sooner to become a high-paid partner in a 
Washington lobbying powerhouse. Mr. Wynn leaves constituents the choice of having no 
representation for six months or holding a costly special election.” Editorial, Trolling for the 
Spoils of Office, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, § 4 (Week in Review), at 13. 
 337. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC ¶ 520d, at 214 (Richard W. Sterling & William C. Scott trans., 
1985). 
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imposed necessity.”338 Although he had the convenient aid of a noble 
lie to reinforce the expectation of public spiritedness in the ruling 
class,339 Plato understood that education would do the heavy lifting.340 
The polis would be best governed when those governing it had 
successfully been inculcated with certain norms of public service and 
devotion to the commonweal. 
This republican ethos can be traced from the ancient world to 
Florentine political theory and from Florentine theory to Atlantic 
practice.341 It is evident in the House of Commons’ insistence that Sir 
Thomas Estcourt could not refuse his seat, because refusal “were to 
prefer the will, or contentment, of a private man, before the desire 
and satisfaction of the whole country.”342 It is apparent, too, in the 
behavior of delegates to the Continental Congress, who endured 
unpleasant service, far from home, in an ineffectual body out of a 
sense of republican obligation.343 And we have seen it in Nathaniel 
Banks’s and Henry Dawes’s insistence that Benjamin Whittemore 
ought to be forced to stand before the House and be punished for 
selling the public trust, rather than be allowed to resign.344 
Arrayed against that, we have seen a conception of legislative 
service as private right. On this view, legislative service is a job like 
any other, to be sought after when desired and put aside when 
something more attractive comes along—that is, when one is “just 
done with” it. This is a view that sees it as preposterous and unjust 
that members who wish to resign may be kept in their seats against 
their will. This is the view that has won the day in America, starting 
with the Second Congress. 
Under this latter view, members who were not allowed to leave 
the House at the time of their choosing would be subject to something 
like specific performance of an employment contract—which, as 
 
 338. Id. ¶ 520e, at 214. 
 339. See id. ¶¶ 414b-15c, at 112–13 (advocating a “noble lie” inculcating the message that 
the ruling class was born to rule the polis, thereby reinforcing an ethic of service among the 
members of that class). 
 340. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 376c-412b, at 72–110 (discussing the education of the guardians). 
 341. See POCOCK, supra note 11 passim (tracing this flow of ideas); see also MICHAEL J. 
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 166 
(1996) (“Jacksonians and Whigs retained the . . . assumption that the public good is more than 
the sum of individual preferences or interests.”); supra text accompanying notes 9–13. 
 342. GLANVILLE, supra note 14, at 101. See generally supra text accompanying notes 14–20. 
 343. See supra text accompanying notes 183–85. 
 344. See supra text accompanying notes 302–10. 
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every first-year contracts student knows,345 is widely frowned upon.346 
Under the republican view, however, legislative service is not 
appropriately analogized to an employment contract. The republican 
would, instead, note that those who voluntarily enlist in the military 
can be forced to remain in the service against their will,347 and, indeed, 
that they can have their tours of duty involuntarily extended.348 The 
military enlistment contract specifically provides that military 
enlistment “is more than an employment agreement.”349 The 
republican would suggest that legislative service is best thought of in 
the same vein. 
I submit that it is the republican view which better expresses our 
sense of what the most representative branch of government ought to 
be.350 House service is unlikely to be foisted on those who have not 
sought it. Is it really so onerous to tell people who ran for House seats 
that they must remain there for two years? Members are well 
compensated, in both financial and psychic wages, and for that 
 
 345. See, e.g., EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 987–99 (6th ed. 
2003). 
 346. See, e.g., Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310, 317–18 (7th Cir. 1894); Lumley v. Wagner, (1852) 
42 Eng. Rep. 687, 693 (Ch.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1) (1981); 
Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 779, 783 (1983). 
But see Nathan B. Oman, Specific Performance and the Thirteenth Amendment, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 1–3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1114799 
(arguing both that, rightly read, the Thirteenth Amendment does not enact a blanket 
prohibition on specific performance of employment contracts and that, in many cases, specific 
performance is preferable to damages as a remedy for breach of an employment contract). 
 347. See 10 U.S.C. § 886 (2006) (providing punishments for going absent without leave). 
 348. See id. § 506 (providing for involuntary extension of enlistments during wartime); id.  
§ 12305 (“[T]he President may suspend any provision of law relating to promotion, retirement, 
or separation applicable to any member of the armed forces who the President determines is 
essential to the national security of the United States.”); see also Doe v. Rumsfeld, 435 F.3d 980, 
984–88 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding military “stop-loss” orders, issued pursuant to 10 U.S.C.  
§ 12305, against constitutional and statutory challenges). 
 349. Armed Forces of the United States, Enlistment/Reenlistment Document, DD Form 
4/1, at 2 (Oct. 2007), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/infomgt/forms/eforms/ 
dd0004.pdf. 
 350. See BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin, in 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND OTHER WRITINGS 3, 112–13 (Kenneth Silverman ed., 1986) (taking as a 
personal maxim, “I shall never ask, never refuse, nor ever resign an Office”); ANDREW SABL, 
RULING PASSIONS: POLITICAL OFFICES AND DEMOCRATIC ETHICS 145 (2002) (arguing that the 
unique virtue of the legislator is “love of fame”—that is, “the determination to engage in 
‘extensive and arduous enterprises for the public good’”). Indeed, the House seems to recognize 
a republican ethic of service insofar as it requires that the resignation of its own officers (for 
example, its clerk, sergeant, etc.) is “subject to acceptance by the House.” CONSTITUTION, 
JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 
109-157, R. II(1), at 358 (2007). 
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compensation we have a right to demand that they commit to putting 
the public interest above their own for a short period.351 Allowing 
resignation as a matter of right sends the message that House service 
is a job like any other, a job that one takes because it suits one’s ends, 
rather than a trust one holds to serve a greater good. In contrast, 
when leaving the House is a matter of legislative grace, rather than 
individual right, the message is sent that devotion to the public weal is 
held above desire for personal gain. This, I suggest, is closer to our 
aspirational conception of the House of Representatives. Indeed, 
even though the Chiltern Hundreds is never denied today, it is still a 
salutary fiction—or, put differently, a noble lie. Members of the 
House of Commons do not resign; they simply accept a Crown office 
incompatible with parliamentary service. They give up one form of 
service in pursuit of another, rather than in pursuit of private ends. 
This is a fiction, but an instructive one. We may well wish to tell a 
similar story about ourselves in the United States: members may 
leave only after the House, in which all Americans are represented on 
terms of numerical equality, has determined that their departures are 
not inimical to the commonweal.352 
But what of the represented? Would it not be in the public 
interest to allow representatives to resign, rather than forcing them to 
 
 351. In support of his argument that the Thirteenth Amendment did not enact a blanket 
prohibition on specific enforcement of employment contracts, Professor Oman has found that 
“involuntary servitude” had four basic components in pre–Thirteenth Amendment caselaw: (1) 
the contract was not freely entered into; (2) there was not bona fide consideration; (3) the 
contract extended over a long period of time; and (4) the contract involved “complete 
domination by the master of the servant, including the right to use violence to coerce the 
servant.” Oman, supra note 346 (manuscript at 24–25). It should be apparent that a member’s 
being obligated to remain in the House would not implicate any of these components. 
 352. It may fairly be asked why this principle of republican legitimacy should not be applied 
to the Senate as well. The simplest answer—that the Constitution provides for resignations from 
the Senate but not from the House—begs the question: we are trying to come up with a reason 
why the House should be held to the republican principles, and if the similarly situated Senate is 
not held to them, that might be evidence that the Constitution embodies no such principles. At 
the Founding, the answer was that the Senate was not similarly situated. See supra Part III.B. 
The Seventeenth Amendment made the houses more similarly situated, but term length may be 
decisive here. Republican principles may suffice to oblige a member to serve out a two-year 
term, but not a six-year term. There are good reasons, both ex post and ex ante, for this 
distinction. Ex post, it may simply seem unfair to oblige senators to serve for over half a decade 
against their will. After all, their circumstances may change dramatically and unforeseeably in 
such a period, whereas circumstances are less likely to change significantly in a two-year period. 
Ex ante, good candidates may simply be unwilling to sign up for a six-year commitment without 
a guaranteed possibility of exit, whereas a two-year commitment is much less of a risk. 
Therefore, allowing a right of resignation from the Senate as a general rule may increase the 
caliber of the candidate pool enough to make it a good republican move. 
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continue to represent their constituents unwillingly? Here, we have to 
consider the alternative. Filling a vacancy takes a considerable 
amount of time;353 moreover, many states do not fill House vacancies 
created after a certain point in the congressional term,354 preferring to 
leave them vacant until the next general election rather than spend 
the money to hold a special election. It seems likely that even an 
unwilling representative is preferable to no representative at all. 
Moreover, it is, again, worth noting that this republican value 
does not depend on any member’s actually being refused permission 
to leave the House, and, again, it seems unlikely that members would 
frequently be refused permission to leave. Rather, the value is in the 
mere fact that members have to ask. In so doing, they reinforce both 
the reality and the public perception of what a representative’s 
relationship to the polity ought to be. 
CONCLUSION 
It is a long road from Sir Thomas Estcourt355 to Dennis Hastert.356 
This Article has sought to map that road, from the monarchical and 
then republican conception that members of the House of Commons 
had no individual right to leave their seats to the more liberal 
conception that members of today’s House of Representatives can 
leave their seats at will. This Article has used this historical map to 
argue that the Constitution gives the House of Representatives the 
power to refuse to allow members to resign, although the House has 
never exercised that power. And finally, this Article has argued that 
Congress has good reasons for ceasing to allow resignations as a 
matter of right. 
Doing so would constitute a turn toward a more republican 
public political theory. It is certainly not the contention of this Article 
 
 353. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1773 (West 2008) (providing that the governor has up to 
fourteen days after the occurrence of a House vacancy to issue a writ of election); CAL. ELEC. 
CODE § 10703(a) (West 2007) (providing that a special election is to occur between 112 and 126 
days after the governor issues the writ); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 54, § 140(a) (2008) (providing 
that special elections to fill vacant House seats must occur between 145 and 160 days after the 
creation of the vacancy). 
 354. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 54, § 140(b) (2008) (providing that no special election 
will be called to fill a vacancy occurring after February 1 of an even-numbered year); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 26, § 12-101(b) (2008) (providing that no special election will be called to fill a vacancy 
occurring after March 1 of an even-numbered year). 
 355. See supra text accompanying notes 14–20. 
 356. See supra text accompanying notes 334–35. 
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that the American Constitution is a purely republican document, any 
more than it is a purely liberal one. Rather, my contention here is 
that, in the context of the relationship between legislators, legislative 
houses, and the public, the pendulum has swung too far in the 
direction of the individual members, and that a republican corrective 
is in order. Republican theory understands the holding of public 
office to be a trust, and those to whom the commonweal has been 
entrusted ought not to be able lightly to put it down to pursue their 
own private ends. Legislators who want to leave office before the end 
of their term ought to be forced to tell their colleagues—and the 
nation—why they wish to surrender the public trust and seek their 
colleagues’ permission to do so. This rule, the rule envisioned by the 
authors and ratifiers of the Constitution, would make it clear that 
legislators exercise power in the people’s interest, not their own. 
Certainly, a return to an older understanding of how members 
leave the House of Representatives is not the only component of such 
a republican corrective, and, indeed, I have elsewhere suggested other 
components.357 This Article has focused on resignations from the 
House, however, because this topic affords a clear view into how a 
once-republican relationship became less so. The history allows us to 
see what values were served by this conception of legislative service, 
and it provides food for thought as to how those values can—and 
whether they should—be assimilated to an, admittedly, more liberal 
and less republican era. I have suggested in this Article ways in which 
they both can and should. 
We may no longer want actually to force members to serve 
against their will by telling them, as the Commons told Estcourt, that 
they have no right to prefer their own “will, or contentment” over 
“the desire and satisfaction of the whole country.”358 But neither, I 
submit, do we want our representatives simply to walk away, 
cheerfully announcing that they do, in fact, prefer their own 
contentment over the desire and satisfaction of the whole country—
 
 357. See Josh Chafetz, Curing Congress’s Ills: Criminal Law as the Wrong Paradigm for 
Congressional Ethics, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 238, 239–42 (2008), http://thepocketpart.org/ 
2008/04/17/chafetz.html (arguing that congressional ethics enforcement should be understood as 
aimed primarily at the maintenance of public trust, not at the detection and punishment of 
wrongdoing); Chafetz, supra note 332, at 171–72 (recommending the creation of Congressional 
Commissioners for Standards); Chafetz, supra note 327 (arguing that the houses of Congress 
should use their inherent power to arrest and imprison their own members when those members 
break house rules). 
 358. GLANVILLE, supra note 14, at 101. 
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or, put differently, that they are “just done” with serving the common 
interest, their two-year commitment notwithstanding.359 This Article’s 
suggestions may, I hope, move us closer to an option more palatable 
than either of those. 
 
 
 359. See Congressional Sources, supra note 335. 
